© 2013 D. B. Altrui

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Notes from Chapters 8-10 of Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine's textbook "Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present"

Chapter 8: Civil War and Foreign Intervention
*Even as China was defending itself from European invaders during the first and second Opium Wars, it was also fighting against Taiping invaders as well; the balance of power between the Han and the Manchus was also under question, gradually shifting towards the Hans. (Page:135)
-The Han majorities in Southern China hoped the Qing dynasty would fall. (Page:137)
*The Taiping rebellion tried to spread to Shanghai, which threatened European interests and brought not only the Qing and Hans down on the Taipings, but also foreigners as well. (Page:145)
*The Qing dynasty needed to partner with foreign powers in order to keep from being overthrown by the Taipings. (Page:147)

Chapter 9: Quelling Domestic Rebellions
*China's loss in the first opium war triggered massive domestic rebellions throughout China as the people began to question the emperor's right to rule. (Page:150)
*The Manchus were too good at holding onto power at the tail end of their dynastic cycle; their refusal to be cut off like old flesh made China vulnerable at a time of critical importance, but also kept China as a cohesive whole for someone to inherit later. (Page:161)

Chapter 10: The Self-Strengthening Movement and Central Government Reforms
*Chinese dynasties on the ropes have traditionally returned to Confucian values in order to restore dynastic strength; this is what the Manchus did after the first Opium War, and it was called the "Self-Strengthening Movement." (Page:165)
-This movement included opening up China to outside ideas. (Page:169)
-A quote during this period was "Chinese learning for essential matters, Western learning for practical matters." (Page:176)

Source: 2014-04-01 17:42:30
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Summary of Benjamin Elman's piece "Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China’s Self-Strengthening Reforms into Scientific and Technological Failure"

Author looks at the naval wars the Qing dynasty participated in to understand why China lost to Japan in the Sino-Japanese war, even after the self-strengthening movement. He holds that Qing China's naval weakness in 1895 is a relic of historical revisionism that takes Japan's victory as being evidence of China's weakness; he believes that a proto-industrial movement was resident in China at the time.

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Summary of James Mulvenon's pieces "So Crooked They Have to Screw Their Pants On: New Trends in Chinese Military Corruption", “To Get Rich is Unprofessional: Chinese Military Corruption in the Jiang Era”, and "Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex"

Author holds that using the Chinese military services as jobs programs is widespread within the PLA.

Source: 2014-03-31 23:44:01
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Notes chapters 4-7 of Ellis Joffe's book, entitled: "A New Military Policy", "'People's War Under Modern Conditions':Military Doctrine in Flux", "Weapons and Equipment: Backward but Better", and "Reforming the PLA: Professionalism First""

*It is difficult to identify the personalities behind particular ideological factions within Chinese military thinking. (Page:47)
-The conflicting factions tend to divide along civil-military lines. (Page:47)
*Economics limit the growth capability of the Chinese military; the opposite must certainly be true as well. (Page:48)
*Discussions about military modernization could only proceed once Mao died. (Page:48)
*Mao was adamant that as economics and the industrial base improved the military should be improved as well; economics as prerequisite to military power. (Page:52)
*The Chinese government has no problem sending military delegations abroad to learn from foreign powers. (Page:55)
*The high cost of buying its way to military modernization from abroad precluded Chinese foreign acquisitions. (Page:66)
-The Chinese were also concerned about supply chain vulnerabilities. (Page:67)
*The "People's War Under Modern Conditions" is a concept used to bridge the gap between old Maoist strategy and the necessities for modernization. (Page:70)
-The change in thinking: Mao would have allowed the enemy into China; this is no longer acceptable. (Page:93)
*Because China faced no direct military threat in the beginning of the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaopeng knew he had time to develop domestic industrial capacity to build up the military. (page:98)
*Deng established the rule that all PLA officers needed to be graduates of a military academy. (Page:129)
*By 1980 the PLA had become so top-heavy that it had precluded new ideas from bubbling up from younger officers. (Page:131)
-This needed to be solved by giving military officers a way to retire with dignity. (Page:132)
*Wang Hai (a military commander) was given the job of executing troop reductions in 1985. (Page:137)
*Comment:The protraction of all mention of specific military personnel from the public light appears to be intentional, and likely reflects some internal insecurity.
*Comment:It is possible that China does a better job of subordinating its military to political aims than the U.S. does, as Clausewitz would have advocated.
*Comment:It's possible that military industrial development has become a jobs program, and military development is now a part of China's economic legitimacy; this is likely almost impossible to stop.

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Notes from Mel Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang's piece "China’s Security: The New Roles Of the Military"

*Authors hold that China's actions vis-a-vis its military reflect the overwhelming influence of traditional realism on Chinese foreign policy thinking. (Page:57)
*China is highly focused on securing its borders. (Page:93)
*The tanks vs. helicopters debate is indicative of internal debate within military ranks about strategy and operations. (Page:107)
*China's lesson from the Gulf War: technology augments people-power; wars cannot be won by people-power alone anymore. (Page:109)
*China's military activity is being "pushed by technology," rather than it being "pulled by strategy." (Page:132)
*Comment: the burgeoning military-industrial complex is driving Chinese military growth forward, not strategic ideas.

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Notes from Chapters 4-7 of James McClain's textbook "Japan: A Modern History"

Chapter 4
*Shogun's chief policymaker Ii Naosuke was the one to open Japan to foreign interaction after Commodore Perry arrived in 1853; he was assassinated in 1860 for the outcome. (Page:119)
*Japan began to perceive the Western threat keenly after the British defeated the Chinese in the Opium War between 1939-1942; this lead many in Japan towards even deeper isolationist policies. (Page:131)
-By this point, though, there was widespread perception that the samurai had become weak and incapable of defending Japan from external threats. (Page:132)
*From the 1820s, American whalers operated progressively closer to Japan from out of ports in Hawaii. (Page:134)
-The discovery of gold in California in 1849 established American presence on the West Coast, and increased the desire to trade with Pacific nations. (Page:135)
*It was U.S. President Fillmore that dispatched Perry to Japan; after Perry arrived in 1853-07-08, he promised to return a year later to hear Japan's response. (Page:137)
-Abe Masahiro was in charge of crafting the Japanese response; he knew coastal defenses were not ready, and the daimyos were divided over how to respond. (Page:137)
-The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed on 1854-03-31; it allowed the U.S. to use only the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, but opened the floodgates to other countries. (Page:138)
--The "Kanagawa Treaty" above was augmented in 1958-07-29 by II Naosuke to include "Commerce," and did so ruthlessly; he was killed for it, but the damage to Japan's isolationism was already done. (Page:142)
*The anti-foreign movement started in 1859/1860 and led to the deaths of a lot of traders. (Page:144)
*Havoc wreaked by foreigners and God after Perry: gold-silver exchange ratio crisis, cholera epidemic, Edo earthquake, crop failures. (Page:148)
*The "royal army" of consolidated daimyo power overthrew the shogun in Edo in 1868. (Page:152)

Chapter 5
*The emperor proclaimed the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868 from his seat in Kyoto after issuing the Charter Oath. (Page:155)
-The charter oath promised: 1. to make government decisions based on the will of the governed, 2. removal of classes, 3. the right of all citizens to pursue happiness, 4. a society based on concepts of international justice, and 5. Japan would pursue knowledge from all around the world. (Page:155)
-The Era was founded upon the conviction to maintain Japan's sovereignty. (Page:156)
*The Seitaisho in 1868 established the Grand Council of State as the chief policy-making body in Japan. (Page:157)
-It accrued power over the daimyo (accepted the surrender of their "domain registers") and moved the Imperial government to Tokyo (renamed from Edo) in 1869. (Page:158)
-The government forced the samurai to exchange their traditional stipends for government bonds, the interest rates of which would serve as the new stipend; inflation took care of reducing the matured principal. (Page:161)
*The Land Tax Reform Law of 1873 formally issued land ownership certificates to individuals and established a 3% flat land tax; some were helped by this, others were hurt. (Page:162)
*Japanese leadership's stated goals, "prosperity and strength, equity with the West," was founded upon the humble understanding the Japan had catching up to do. (Page:165)
*Some within the Meiji government suggested invading Korea in 1873 in order to give the ronin samurai something to do and keep them satisfied. (Page:164)
*The Satsuma Rebellion was the last stand of the samurai against the onslaught of the Meiji Restoration; it was led by Saigo Takamori. (Page:168)
*The Meiji Dream = "national independence, treaty revision, equality with the West, and domestic tranquillity and prosperity." (Page:169)
*The shogunate sent seven diplomatic missions to the U.S. before its demise in 1868 in order to learn about America's institutions. (Page:170)
-The Iwakura Mission was an example of the post-Meiji Restoration attempt to reverse engineer Western success. (Page:171)
--The U.S. informed the Japanese mission that it would not renegotiate the unequal treaties until Japan reformed its government more in the U.S. image. (Page:172)
--It was heartened to learn that the West had achieved their prosperity and relative advantage within the span of only 40 or so years from the beginning of the 1800s. (Page:174)

Chapter 6
*The Japanese Constitution was formally issued on 1889-02-11 by the emperor; it was followed by Kimigayo, played for the first time as the unofficial Japanese national anthem. (Page:183)
-Meiji leaders became convinced of the value of Constitutionalism after visiting the West. (Page:185)
*The Constitution-writers' intent and challenge was to congeal the citizens of the ~300 Japanese domains into <i>kokumin</i>. (Page:197)
-The writers made the emperor act as the focal point around which to rally the people; the shogun had previously put themselves in that position. (Page:198)
--In order to do this, the emperor travelled throughout Japan (the Chinese emperor never left the castle...). (Page:198)
*Whereas the U.S. placed ideas at the center of its national identity, Japan placed the emperor. (Page:200)
*The Constitution also established the formal legislature, which heralded the arrival of a new set of elected elites in government. (Page:205-206)

Chapter 7
*National slogans like "Prosperous Nation, Strong Military" and "Increase Production, Promote Industry" are indicative of the power of nationalism the Japan enjoyed in the Meiji era. (Page:207)
-Comment: The Japanese used a simple, explicit policy to rally the citizens of the country around common ideas that led to collective action; this was consistent with the unifying force of the Emperor's charter oath at the beginning of the Meiji Era that ushered in the Meiji Dream.
*Maejima Hisoka is considered the father of the Japanese postal system; the Japan Postal system was put at the center of the national communication system. (Page:211)
*The first train lines in Japan were laid between Shinbashi and Yokohama, and Osaka and Kobe; the construction was financed and procured resources from markets in England. (Page:211)
-The Meiji Emperor was on the maiden voyage of the Shinbashi-Yokohama line. (Page:211)
-The Tokaido Trunk Line was completed in 1889. (Page:212)
*The economic havoc brought upon the common Japanese citizen by the transition from the shogunate to the Meiji era forced them to become self-sufficient and clever at reverse-engineering Western marvels. (Page:221)
*Import substitution worked for Japan as it transitioned from domestic cotton-growing to domestic creation of finished cotton products from imported cotton by the beginning of the twentieth century. (Page:227)
*Japanese entrepreneurs claimed they were devoted to idea of the industrialization of Japan, not the fattening of their own pockets; regardless of whether this was all talk or not, it reinforced the nationalist ideals. (Page:230)
-<i>Zaibatsu</i> were symbolic of this symbiosis with private industry and government. (Page:231,234)
*National consensus on national objectives was key to unified economic effort in Japan. (Page:243)

Source: 2014-04-02 22:02:11
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Source Thesis: NS3600

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Notes from Marc Goetschalckx's piece "Supply Chain Engineering"

*Logistics management deals with managing the flow of resources between nodes in the supply chain system; the resources that flow through the system can be "materials," "information," or "monetary," among likely many other things. (Page:1-2)
-Comment: Consider this in relation to EMMI.
*A supply chain is "a network of functional organizations that through their activities perform the logistics functions." (Page:3)
*There is no single model that can represent all supply chains. (Page:525)
*The Distribution Channel Selection Model presents a supplier with a set of options through which to pass its products en route to a final customer, such that the most cost-effective route can be chosen; it can contain a large number of variables. (Page:529-530)

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Notes from Steve New's piece "Supply Chains: Construction and Legitimation"

*Supply chains are made up of a series of links that connect suppliers to customers and end users; they are made up of a system of links and nodes. (Page:73)

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Notes from National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office's piece "NMIO Technical Bulletin: Volume 06"

*GINA allows systems-of-systems to be created out of a common modeling vocabulary. (Page:12)
-It facilitates the sharing of EMMI amongst disparate nodes in a system that may talk different languages, but the concepts of which can be translated to produce interoperability in Web Services and data streams that utilize semantic syntaxes like XML. (Page:13)

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Notes from Chapters 5 and 7 of Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine's textbook "Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present"

Chapter 5: The Arrival of the West (86-97)
*In order to defend China from outside influence, the Qing Manchus would need to abandon some Confucian ideals, which the Manchus found abhorrent. (Page:86)
*Chinese silks could be found in the Roman Empire. (Page:86)
*For most of its history people have traded with China in order to get Chinese goods, rather than China demanding foreign goods, and China saw this one-sided trade as helping maintain a security safety net through market demand. (Page:87)
*After the Dutch established a base of trade on the island of Taiwan in 1624, they controlled much of the regional trade by foreigners. (Page:89)
-It was eventually retaken by China in 1662. (Page:89)
*In 1630s Qing China started to feel Russian expansion into territories that were previously assumed to be Chinese. (Page:91)
*The idea of states being equal under international law was new even to European states after the Treaty of Westphalia, but incomprehensible to the Chinese who had always assumed the primacy of the emperor. (Page:93-94)
*Europeans were excluded from Chinese society because they had no <i>guanxi</i> basis from which to conduct official interaction. (Page:94)
*Comment: By the time China was allowing unfettered access to its shores to foreign powers, and debates over primacy had begun, it was already too late.
*Chinese government rejected the idea that a separate moral law existed apart from secular law. (Page:94)
*Religious Missionaries not only brought religion with them, but also a scientific view that the knowledge of man was always expanding; this was contrary to Chinese beliefs. (Page:95)
-The existence of any kind of contact between two antithetical belief systems was bound to create conflict. (Page:95)
--Comment: The Japanese avoided conflict by removing interaction entirely.

Chapter 7: Expanding Commercial Relations with the West (114-128)
*Comment: Had the Europeans not been distracted by China, they might have tried harder on Japan; Japan was also farther away than China. To the U.S., Japan was the first country they hit on their way West.
*After it appeared the Europeans were getting the upper hand on the Qing Dynasty, Han Chinese began to realize that the dynastic cycle was waning, which led to further domestic unrest; the Chinese were too willing to give up on their own leadership. (Page:114)
*In 1905 about 25% of Chinese males were addicted to opium. (Page:116)
*Conflict in the 19th century between China and Europeans came from: failing international silver trade, China's weakness, Europe's strength, and the importance of trade. (Page:127)
*Whereas Japan opened up to the West as a consolidated nation (and the Tokugawa Shogunate had to step down), the Manchus avoided the creation of a unified national front so that they could maintain their minority rule. (Page:128)

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Notes from John Fishel's piece "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night"

*The UN provides a common framework of objectives around which nations can collaborate; specifically under the auspices of peacekeeping operations. (Page:372)
*MOOTW is a concept inherently biased towards the primacy of WAR. (Page:374)
*Clausewitz: policies are inextricably linked to the wars carried out in their execution; war should never be divorced from policy. (Page:375)
*The British codified non-state vs. state military actions as "small wars." (Page:378)
*The "country team" concept helped to unify U.S. military and diplomatic efforts around achieving U.S. policy goals in South America. (Page:384)
-This approach was particularly successful in El Salvador. (Page:386)
*For the U.S., Unity of Effort is needed because "all contemporary and future conflict is joint and interagency while most will also be combined;" in order to create cohesive action, "Unity of Effort is tied directly to the principle of war, the Objective." (Page:388)
-While Unity of Command may not be possible, Unity of Effort should at least be striven for. (Page:388)
-General Lindsay used the construct of the "Joint Mission Analysis (JMA)" to determine what the common objectives were for all the CINCs that his new USSOCOM would be supporting after being stood up for the first time. (Page:391-392)
*The author supposes a supported/supporting role be applied across each of the DIME agencies depending upon the policy objectives that need to be accomplished in any given situation; the military does not always have the lead. (Page:394)
-Each of the organizations in their political, economic, information, or military swim lanes should be dynamically combined in a "task organized" manner. (Page:395)
*Comment: The temptation is to look at the ROMO as merely a description of the full range of operations that a military conducts. In reality, policies are the unifying characteristic of the ROMO; they connect all operations to be in support of the execution of common policy objectives.

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Notes from U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's piece "Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: Joint Operations, Joint Operations Across the Range of Military Operations"

*The false premise is that the U.S. military alone is responsible for the full spectrum of operations across the ROMO; interagency is an unavoidable: "CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must work with US chiefs of mission, Department of State (DOS), and other departments and agencies to best integrate military actions with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power in unified action". (Page:V-3)
*Military operations are conducted to satisfy a particular mission. (Page:V-3)
*There is brief reference to higher guiding documents, but no reference to how other agencies are accomplishing the same types of tasks, so that the military can have cognizance of what the DoS is doing in support of the same policies.

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Notes from U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard's piece "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower"

*USN, USMC, and USCG came together for the first time with this document to create a "unified maritime strategy." (Page:2)
-They are all subject to the same objectives under the NSS, NDS, NMS, and NSMS; the same does not necessarily go for foreign forces, though. (Page:5)
*Preparation and engagement are key: "trust and cooperation cannot be surged." (Page:11)
*Some policies in this document are universal in nature: "foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners," or "prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system." (Page:11)
*The U.S. military needs to continue to focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and ISR. (Page:16)

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Voice of America: China

Last Refreshed:2014-04-19 00:54:53

Outlink: http://www.voachinese.com/api/zyyyoeqqvi
Source Thesis: Voice of America Website

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Notes from Tom Hone's piece "Range of Military Operations"

*Partnership for Peace Program: Cold War war termination program. (Time:1:30)
*ROMO: "extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns." (Time:2:52)
*Range of operations in the military is "boundless," unlike other professions like a lawyers or doctor. (Time:3:30)
*ROMO is "a way of thinking about these problems that assumes they are related." (Time:9:00)
-Applies OPART to different types of campaigns (Time:9:30)
-All operations fall along a line that varies depending upon the probability of occurrence and the level of violence. (Time:10:36)
*Each type of operation requires its unique set of tools to accomplish. (Time:12:50)
*Admiral Bristol to SECNAV in 1928: "The Navy is not primarily for threatening or active operations against people like the Chinese to enforce our rights at the muzzle of a gun. The Navy... has a positive mission to assist in the maintenance of peace which is just as important as its warlike mission in defending the country." (Time:17:36)
*ROMO is hampered by the unclear line of demarcation between the DoS and the DoD. (Time:22:18)
*On efficiency vs. effectiveness in the military: "...it must never be overlooked that while efficiency in war is desirable, effectiveness is mandatory." (<i>Industrial Mobilization Plan</i>, War Department, 1933) (Time:23:37)

Source: 2014-01-22 11:57:00
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Notes from William Whitson's piece "The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971"

*From 1927 to 1969, the CCP was constantly searching for the right balance of military ethic and military style, and the intervening crises came about because of the lack of this balance. (Page:7)
-The 1920s saw the rise of the "warlord model." (Page:7)
--The personal political status of the warlord was at the crux of any strength in this model. (Page:9)
--This model was often defined by a lack of concern for subordinate welfare. (Page:10)
-Another model was the "Russian Model." (Page:14)
--The Russian model was based on the idea that all soldiers should be "politically conscious" and passionate about their cause. (Page:17)
-A third model, called the "Peasant Model," (bandit warfare) was taken from Chinese history, which most peasants were familiar with, in contrast to the Warlord or Russian Models. (Page:18)
--Since this was the most widely understood model to Chinese peasants, it provided a basis and convenient vocabulary from which to build a people's army. (Page:23)
*The conflict between the three models was the primary source of controversy within the Communist party from 1927 to 1969. (Page:22,23)

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Notes from Mao Zedong's piece ""Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan", and "Problems of War and Strategy”"

*Mao conceded that regular war was necessary against the Japanese, with guerrilla war secondary. (Page:79)
*Guerrillas require the support of the local people in order to establish bases. (Page:97)
*Guerrilla warfare on a massive scale should be given general direction from a top leader, but be decentralized in execution at the small scale level; the proper balance of control and decentralization must be determined based on circumstances. (Page:111)

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Notes from Edward Dreyer's piece "China at War, 1901-1949"

*Mao intended for his army to be like the "fish swimming in the sea," alternately switching between guerrilla and regular war in a way that their enemies could not. (Page:158)
*During fighting between the KMT and the Communists, by the 1940s the Japanese had already clearly identified the Communists as their primary enemy. (Page:250)
*In 1941, the U.S. through Stillwell was heavily entrenched in assisting the KMT against the Japanese and the Communists. (Page:288)
*The Communists avoided engaging the Japanese in a large-scale offensive during the 1942-1945 time frame. (Page:292)
-After the war, they used captured Japanese arms to greatly increase their end strength. (Page:329)
*Historians chalk the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war up to good strategy. (Page:350)
-Mao did the small things first, and avoided holding territory. (Page:351)
-Mao had no formal military training, and often drew on historical Chinese writings about military strategy rather than from foreign ones. (Page:353)

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Notes from U.S. Department of War's piece "The Chinese Communist Army"

*This report divided the armed forces of Communist China into "Field Forces," "Local Forces," and the "People's Militia." (Page:177)
*By 1944 the PLA already had 475K troops and was dividing itself into military regions. (Page:178,179)
*This report digs down into the particular structure of the PLA in its early years, as far down as the squad level. (Page:185)
*The PLA did not have a Navy at this point, just a couple of junks near Kiangsu and Shantung. (Page:189)
*The PLA used competitive metrics when training new members and provided prizes to those who did well. (Page:190)
-The most important tool they had was the hand grenade. (Page:191)
*Leaders in the PLA did not wear insignia; the assumption was the leaders were so loving and well known to their subordinates would know who they were without the need for insignia. (Page:198)
*The U.S. rated the Communist Regular Army well in this report; its morale and capabilities were high for a guerrilla army. (Page:205)
-Emphasis was placed on their ability to indefinitely continue a program of guerrilla harassment under the conditions of the time. (Page:207)

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Notes from James McClain's piece "Japan: A Modern History"

Chapter 1
*Tokugawa Ieyasu took the title of shogun on 1603-02-12 from Fushimi Castle. (Page:5)
*The Tokugawa era led to the flourishing of Japan to one of the highest standards of living in the world at the time by the end of the Tokugawa era in 1868. (Page:10)
*Kublai Khan tried to invade Japan in 1274 and 1281 but failed both times; the Japanese believed the <i>kamikaze</i> had saved them. (Page:17)
*Fujiwara Seika was the first Japanese monk to learn of neo-Confucianism from China and taught it to Hayashi Razan who taught it to Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1605. (Page:35)
-Neo-Confucianism appealed to shogun because it showed a path to peace and order in society. (Page:36)
--It also demanded the rulers be just towards their citizens; legitimacy of the governing became an expectation of the governed. (Page:36)
*Shogun in the Tokugawa era held sole right to interact with foreign powers. (Page:40)
-By taking control of foreign policy, the shogun concentrated power in himself. (Page:46)
-Before Tokugawa, Hideyoshi invaded Korea; he built a mound of noses into a "hill of ears" in Kyoto, but still did not end up victorious. (Page:40)
*The Portuguese were the first to arrive in Japan at Tanegashima in 1543. (Page:42)
*It was religion that led Hideyoshi to jealousy and violence towards outsiders. (Page:43)
*From 1633 to 1641, the shogunate issued progressively more strict edicts that removed all foreigners from Japan or moved them (the Dutch) to Dejima; only the Dutch, Chinese, and occasionally the Koreans were allowed inside Japan. (Page:44)

Chapter 2
*Japan industrialized on its own in the Tokugawa era, with urbanization taking place around daimyo castles; Edo led the way. (Page:53)
-Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto were not only castles, but central nodes in increasingly interconnected domestic trade networks. (Page:54)
*The shogunate standardized metrics across the country and opened mints in Ginza. (Page:57)
-Also systematically made domestic ocean waterways navigable to connect far-flung parts of the country to the capitals. (Page:57)
*A Japanese man named Iwase Kichibei domestically (and independently) produced the watermill-powered silk spinning wheel in Japan, spurring the Japanese industrial revolution. (Page:62)
-Hideyoshi's conquest of Korea didn't succeed militarily, but it brought back a variety of cotton that spurred the Japanese to use cotton over hemp to make their clothes. (Page:63)
*In the 18th century, Japan fiercely defended its sovereignty and balance of trade to ensure it wasn't being controlled by external powers. (Page:66)

Chapter 3
*The adventures of Yaji and Kita along the burgeoning tourist road of Tokaido in the <i>Tokaidochu Hizakurige</i> is emblematic of an increasing cultural sense in the 19th century of Japanese-ness. (Page:76)
*In the peaceful Tokugawa era, samurai lost their way. (Page:80)
*The Tokugawa shoguns kicked foreigners out of the country in order to promote domestic stability. (Page:111)
*By the time the brash Americans showed up in Japan, the shoguns were encountering a host of domestic problems that amplified the external threat to the regime, producing a "crisis of confidence." (Page:112)

Source: 2014-04-02 22:02:11
Content: Hard Copy
Source Thesis: NS3600

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Notes from John Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, and Albert Craig's piece "Yi Dynasty Korea: A Model Confucian Society"

*The Korean dynasty started by Yi Song-gye lasted from 1392-1910, longer than any Chinese dynasty. (Page:300)
-It fully adopted Confucian values from China. (Page:301)
--This made Korean mindsets rigid, narrow, and dogmatic; even more so than the Chinese. (Page:301)
--At the same time, it did not limit the creativity of the Korean people to develop indigenously. (Page:301)
*Korea also adopted China's examination system as the primary route into public service. (Page:305)
*The <i>yangban</i> system led to a limitation of access to the higher levels of Korean government to hereditary means only. (Page:306)
*Despite its many similarities, Korea was culturally different enough from China that is was under no threat of being assimilated. (Page:310)
*The Japanese first invaded Korea in 1592 when Japanese emperor Hideyoshi tried to conquer Korea on his way to defeat China; he took Seoul, but was stopped by the Ming and the Korean Navy eventually defeated him with the world's first armored ships ("turtle ships"). (Page:316)
-When Tokugawa took control of Japan in 1600 he didn't follow in his predecessor's footsteps. (Page:316)
*The Qing first secured their flanks by assuring Korean allegiance to the Qing dynasty before moving on to overthrow the Ming dynasty. (Page:317)
*Korean <i>yangban</i> on mission to Peking first came in contact with Jesuit missionaries in the 1600s. (Page:320)

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Notes from Dennis Blasko's piece "Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century"

Preface and Chapter 1
*China uses something called the "Big Lie" technique to obfuscate its real intentions. (Page:xvi)
*China has consistently declared its policies and strategies; it is the job of foreign government and civilian authorities to match up declared policy with action. (Page:xvi)
*The PLA was founded as the "Red Army of Workers and Peasants" of the CCP in 1927-08-01 after breaking from the KMT following three years of cooperation from 1924 against the Northern Warlords. (Page:2)
-The initial resistance was led by Zhou Enlai and Zhu De. (Page:3)
*After fighting the Japanese during WWII, in 1946 civil war broke out again in China, and the Red Army became the PLA. (Page:3)
*Tienanmen was a fight between the "party's army" and the "people's army;" since then, nobody dares to try to separate the army from the party anymore. (Page:5)
*Changes in China's mental approach to war (force structure, doctrine, standard of living) is just as important as the PLA's acquisition of increasingly potent military hard power. (Page:7)
*China often chalks large portions of its military budget increases to increases in the stand of living of its troops. (Page:11)
-China refuses to itemize and show the specific allocation of its funds, though. (Page:12)
*Consensus-building is more important in the Chinese government now than ever before. (Page:14)
*<i>Guanxi</i> (social connections) and <i>xitong</i> (systems, or stovepiping) define how the PLA is made up internally. (Page:14,15)
-The idea of <i>tixi</i> ("system of systems") is supposed to break down stovepiping. (Page:15)
*A "people's war" is one that defends China as a whole; a "local war" is a more modern definition of a limited or local conflict rather than a full-scale defense of the nation. (Page:16)
*China struggles to find a balance between "red" and "expert" in its military. (Page:18)
*The PLA went through three great force reductions in 1985, 1997, and 2003. (Page:25)
*The PAP has such missions as: internal security, goldmine protection, forest protection, firefighting, and border security. (Page:27)

Chapter 2: What is the PLA?
*The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Ministry of State Security (MSS) provide domestic security for China; whereas the MPS does domestic law-enforcement, the MSS focuses on both domestic and international intelligence operations. (Page:20,21)
*State Council --> Ministry of National Defense --> Central Military Commission --> 4 General Departments --> Military Regions (Page:32,39)
*Regiments and Brigades are the first level at which combined arms are formed in the PLA. (Page:46)
*The defense industrial sector is administratively separate from the PLA; the PLA is now a "buyer" of civilian industry military products. (Page:54)

Chapter 8: Role of the PLA in Chinese Society
*Deploying the PLA to UN PKO was a move by the CPC to restore the goodwill lost by the PLA and PAP after Tienanmen. (Page:211)
*At the same time as the PLA downplayed the importance of the SARS epidemic in 2002-2003, it also constructively assisted in combating it. (Page:214)
*The PLA is the tertiary internal security force for China, in case the MPS and PAP fail. (Page:216)
*In addition to the deployment of PLA troops to support UN operations, China also deploys MPS and PAP personnel as well. (Page:221)

Source: 2014-04-01 22:03:35
Source Thesis: NS4620

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Notes from Steven Mosher's piece "Great Han Chauvinism"

*Mao failed at most of his goals. (Page:61)
-His primary mistake was in choosing to use Communism to achieve world power status. (Page:62)
*Modern Chinese leadership has not completely abandoned Mao, though. (Page:63)
*The one who decided to make Tienanmen violent was purged for his decision. (Page:72)
*Author sees China's military buildup as evidence of China's greater ambitions to conquer more of the world, even after it retakes Taiwan. (Page:94)

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Notes from Bruce Elleman,S.C.M. Paine's piece "Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present"

Part 1, Chapters 1-4 (26-84)
*The Chinese New Year is based on the 12-month lunar cycle, and falls on a different day each year; the Chinese added a 13th month to compensate for the leap year. (Page:26)
-Starts with the first day of the new moon of the new year and takes 15 days. (Page:26)

Chapter 1: Fall of Ming, Rise of Qing
*The Han Chinese founder of the Ming Empire (1368-1644), named the Hongwu, overthrew the Mongol (Yuan) Dynasty (1279-1368). (Page:31)
-One of the Ming military's primary jobs was to defend China's northern borders from further Mongol attack. (Page:32)
*The Ming dynasty was the source of the Zheng He voyages. (Page:32)
-Chinese lament the pre-mature cancellation of these voyages because they could have brought the Chinese in contact with pre-Industrial Revolution Europe. (Page:33)
*The Ming government was administratively run by 50K eunuchs. (Page:33)
*The Qing Manchus started their conquest of the Ming from the North. (Page:34)
-Nurgaci led this revolution; he divided his society and military into a banner system, with yellow, white, red and blue banners. (Page:35)
--These banners were used to selectively call specific groups of troops to actions. (Page:35)
*The Qing ordered all men to grow the queue; many Ming Han resistors killed themselves in protest because it violated Confucian rules to not alter the skin or hair. (Page:37)
*The Manchus were a minority that successfully governed a Han majority population. (Page:43)
-The civil service examination was one way that Manchus rewarded good Hans with good government positions. (Page:43)

Chapter 2: Qing Rule (Qianlong emperor): political and economics
*The Qianlong emperor used 10 military campaigns to expand China's territory to the North into Mongolia and to the West to Xinjiang. (Page:47)
-The Qing used the tributary system to formalize its control over far-flung territories; its goal was to secure the periphery, rather than extract resources. (Page:51)
*The <i>guanxi</i> system started causing corruption problems in the Qing empire. (Page:53)
*Confucius preached that "civilian scholar elites" should rule societies, not military leaders. (Page:54)
*The Manchus succeeded by keeping a majority of the old Han ruling structure in place; they just moved into the Forbidden City and the world moved on. (Page:59)
*Qianlong's China is the glorious Chinese period that all subsequent Han leadership try to recreate. (Page:59)

Chapter 3: Society during the Qing
*The Han ethnicity takes its roots from the Han Dynasty (206 BC - 220AD), which was the first dynasty after the Qin (Ch'in) Dynasty (221 BC - 206 BC), which was the founding of China. (Page:62)
*Confucius divided society into four groups: scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants. (Page:65)
*Where Westerners use law and rules to regulate trade, Han Chinese use systems of <i>quanxi</i> to regulate trade relationships. (Page:67)
-This conflict extends into today, where universalistic law governs Western actions at all societal strati, and Chinese still seek harmony through social networks. (Page:68)
*The Qing dynasty allowed their conquered lands to keep their religions. (Page:70)
*Han people crippled their women through foot-binding; the Manchu women were much more mobile and vibrant. (Page:71)

Chapter 4: Dominance by the Qing Manchus over the Han
*Much of pre-1900 Chinese learned centered around the "Five Classics" and the "Four Books." (Page:77)
*New dynasties compiled the history of old dynasties and then destroyed the source material; nevertheless, new dynasties often heralded the accomplishments of the previous dynasties, thus holding aloft the idea of China. (Page:81)
*The meritocratic examination system started in the Han Dynasty. (Page:82)
*The Han were so assured that their system of knowledge held the complete capacity of all human knowledge (Examination System, Five Classics, and Four Books) that they rested on their laurels and were unprepared for new knowledge from the outside world; the hazards of living in an echo chamber. (Page:84)

Chapter 6: The Decline of the Qing
*Qianlong's expensive expansion of China broke the bank and left the Qing Dynasty unprepared for foreign invasion. (Page:100)
*Corruption broke Qing China: 1. tax fraud, 2. <i>guanxi</i>, 3. eunuchs got smart and greedy. (Page:101)
*The banner forces that had formed the backbone of Qing military expansion were complacent and backward by the time Western militaries showed up. (Page:102)
*Concubines continue to be a problem in both China and Taiwan; the Chinese government has tried to outlaw it in various ways over the years. (Page:102,103)
*Rhinos used to be plentiful in China; their skin was used as military armor. (Page:105)
*The Qing inadvertently allowed South American silver to control the wholeness of their economic system by allowing the silver-to-copper exchange rate to fluctuate with foreign imports; when silver imports collapsed and raised the value of silver, so did the value of the copper collapse as well. (Page:110)
*With the Qing leaders increasingly isolated in the Forbidden City, they lost touch with their militaries and societies. (Page:111)

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China Leadership Monitor

Last Refreshed:2014-04-18 14:42:17

Source: Alice Miller
Outlink: http://www.hoover.org/rss/hoover.xml
Source Thesis: NS3600

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Notes from David Sniffen's piece "The Dynamics and Value of “Trust” in the Military"

*Because it's so obviously necessary, "trust" is often given second shrift to other important troop controlling mechanisms like C2. (Page:1)
*Trust is the most organic organizing concept that binds together militaries and the citizens of the countries they represent. (Page:1)

Source: 2014-03-24 15:35:46
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Notes from U.S. Government Accountability Office's piece "Results-Oriented Government: Practices that can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies"

*The GAO asserts that the definition of "common outcomes" and "compatible policies" are the top keys to creating collaboration between federal agencies, and that establishing "joint strategies" supports that. (Page:Summary,10)
-IMPORTANT: Within the digital, establishing "common" or "compatible" elements is akin to linking multiple sub-nodes back to a common super-node.

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Notes from Max Stier and Lloyd Howell's piece "Building the Enterprise: Nine Strategies for a More Integrated, Effective Government"

*Americans rally well around clearly defined objectives, but do so best in times of crisis. (Page:1)
*Cross-cutting goals are ones that single federal agencies are incapable of addressing alone; addressing problems with cross-cutting, multi-agency solutions requires the government to act more like an enterprise. (Page:4)
*"Securing our nation and its borders" is an example of a cross-cutting federal objective. (Page:4)
*The GPRAMA led to improvements, but outcomes are still not fully positive yet. (Page:5)
*The GPRA in 1998 showed promise, but ultimately failed because it didn't have resolute Presidential backing and had no program lead. (Page:10)
-In order to succeed, explicit policies should be tied explicitly to performance metrics. (Page:10)
*The President's budget is not an effective way to define priorities; budgets are inherently stove-piped and do not lead to inter-agency cooperation. (Page:10)
*Enterprise goals should be approved by the President to ensure political backing and cross-agency support. (Page:13)
*Comment: The "priority goals" are actually policies; in order to transition these policies into a digital environment, they need to have unique digital identifiers.

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Summary of U.S. Government's piece "Public Law 111-352: GPRA Modernization Act of 2010"

This law mandates the creation of strategic plans, performance goals, and agency priority goals in order to improve inter-agency cooperations. In numerous places it also mandates that, in intervals of not greater than one year, every agency post their performance metrics on a publicly visible website in a "searchable, machine-readable" way.

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Notes from U.S. Government Accountability Office's piece "Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Views on the Progress and Plans for Addressing Government-wide Management Challenges"

*The GPRA Modernization Act is important because it works to create cross-agency priority goals to help focus leadership; Performance.gov, performance review, and quarterly updates are the handmaidens of this (Page:Summary)
*This report recommends improving "collaborative mechanisms" to address government problems that require multi-agency buy-in. (Page:Summary)
*The GPRAMA mandates that the OMB "compile and make publicly available a comprehensive list of all federal programs identified by agencies, and to include the purposes of each program, how it contributes to the agency’s mission, and recent funding information" (Page:7)
*As one example of a set of programs that could be consolidated, there are 30 agencies that deal with geospatial information; there is plenty of room to cut down on overlap and save federal dollars. (Page:9)
*Key to getting agencies to cooperate effectively is clearly defining roles and responsibilities, assigning accountable parties, consolidating accounting and resources, and developing metrics by which to evaluate outcomes. (Page:9,10)
*"Strategic Reviews" should be used regularly to evaluate performance and determine ways to strengthen collaboration on cross-agency problems that have clearly defined objectives. (Page:10)
*Performance measurement is still difficult for federal agencies because of the challenge of consolidating metrics across various programs and agencies. (Page:11)
*The effectiveness and efficiency of government is directly related to how accessible and reliable financial and performance metrics are. (Page:12)

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Notes from Jonathan Pinkus's piece "Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide"

*Intel is used by governments to provide evidence for its actions to its citizens. (Page:33)
-Intel can also be distorted by governments for political reasons. (Page:33)
*IMPORTANT: The author argues that intelligence assessments should be released to the public directly by intelligence organizations, rather than being filtered through political institutions first. (Page:33)
*The media act as a secondary filter--sometimes with an agenda of their own--on intelligence that has already been filtered politically. (Page:34)
*President Johnson asked the IC to write a report that made the point he wanted to be made about the Vietnam War. (Page:35)
*The Bush Administration's filtering of caveated intelligence assessments about Sadam Hussein's WMD program is an example of how governments can distort intel to serve political purposes. (Page:40)
*WikiLeaks released intel about the sale of weapons to Iran by North Korea, bypassing the government and allowing citizens to assess the intel on their own. (Page:45)
*Government assurances no longer satisfy the public's demand for justification; only raw intelligence will do. (Page:45)

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Notes from Eline Severs and Alexander Mattelaer's piece "A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy? It’s about Legitimation, Stupid!"

*Legitimacy must be continually earned in representative democracies. (Page:1)
*Governments can only continue to survive if they have the support of their citizens. (Page:2)
*Political legitimacy can be measured with metrics like political participation, active support, paying taxes, and the absence of protest, amongst other means. (Page:3)
-It can also be interpreted as "political trust;" Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe assert that trust lowers the cost of governance. (Page:3)
*Political trust is decreasing in advanced countries because citizens are not being satisfied by simplistic forms of representative democracy like voting. (Page:4)
*Citizens don't feel a sense of control over the monetary policies made by unelected technocratic elites. (Page:6)
*Political control of decisions that impact a state is increasingly shifting towards supra-national levels, taking the sense of control and governmental legitimacy out of the hands of voting citizens. (Page:8)

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The @OccupySandy movement is important because it shows how distributed ("Progressive") networks can accomplish goals when they are allowed the freedom to collaborate around ideas rather than organizational structures.

Common Twitter hashtags and fund targets allowed resources to consolidate with directionality.

Source: 2014-03-10 20:01:55
File: 1394506915.pdf,Link:2014-03-21 01:39:41

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When massive amounts of donation money come into a singular WePay-type account, a first-in first-out method of payment attribution to monetary distribution is likely the most satisfying way of showing donators how their money went to good use.

The first money that goes in is matched with the first money that goes out, such that donors can see where their dollars went.

Source: 2014-03-10 20:01:55
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Summary of Milena Nikolova and Carol Graham's piece "Employment, Late-Life Work, Retirement, and Well-Being in Europe and the United States"

The authors show that people of retirement age that voluntarily choose to continue to work, either in full- or part-time status, are on average happier than their counterparts that choose not to work or are forced to work.

Source: 2014-03-10 20:01:01
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Summary of Navy Task Force for Climate Change's piece "U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014-2030"

This document does a fantastic job of turning high-level policy document into line-item tasks for the national security establishment to work on. Examples of this are in stark contrast to the high-level military documents that define day-to-day military operations. This is possibly because of the obviously goal-oriented nature of establishing a POAM for rules and norms that do not exist yet.

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Be honest: my thesis "smacks of" a Progressivist view of the importance of the public opinion; the timeless argument between representative and direct democracy.

-It does not seek a more direct democracy, but a focusing of the societal discussion around specific issues by removing the filters that shape the national discussion
-Direct democracy isn't necessarily needed if the people have a more refined awareness of the policies and issues by which to hold their representatives accountable

Source: 2014-03-06 07:37:37
File: 1394120257.pdf,Link:2014-03-19 22:50:41

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Notes from Ronald Pestritto and Taylor Kempema's piece "The Birth of Direct Democracy: What Progressivism Did to the States"

*James Madison: representative government is to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chose body of citizens;" "the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose." (Page:3)
-Madison believed that public opinion needed to be "refined" by representatives; Herbert Croly argued against this. (Page:4)
*Progressives believed that human nature had matured enough to allow for people to represent themselves more directly in government. (Page:3)
*Theodore Roosevelt: believed in his day that the tyranny had shifted to the minority. (Page:3)
*While at the same time as Progressives seek to put more power in the hands of the populace, they necessarily take power out of the hands of elected leaders and put it into the hands of unelected "experts." (Page:5)
*Conservatives have traditionally fought the "recall," arguing that the ability to recall certain leaders, especially judges, is a threat to individual liberty and endangers the ability of government to make unpopular decisions. (Page:6)
*Herbert Croly: "The two-arty system, like other forms of representative democracy, proposes to accomplish for the people a fundamental political task which they ought to accomplish for themselves." (Page:8)
*Legislative reference services were a direct outcrop of a combination of Progressivism and the increasing complexity of the legislative environment around businesses; the modern implementation of this is the Congressional Research Service. Such organizations influence legislators, but cannot approve legislation. (Page:11)
*Progressives are open about their desire to undermine the republican principles (representative government) upon which the U.S. was built by the founding fathers. (Page:15)
-Representative government is intended to "filter out the factious or tyrannical tendencies of passionate, immediate majority opinion." (Page:15)
*This paper argues both for and against Progressive functions:
-Anti-Progressive opinion is best summed up in this quote: "No one who has spent any time in the state of California--the state where the Progressive reforms described in this paper have arguably had the greatest impact--can rationally argue that it is well governed." (Page:16)
-Pro-Progressive opinion is best summed up in this quote: "Direct democracy, by circumventing these now-corrupt institutions, may be the only means of liberating citizens from entrenched liberal interests." (Page:16)

Source: 2014-03-06 07:37:37
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Summary of Lukas Schoenenberger, Andrea Schenker-Wicki, and Mathias Beck's piece "Analysing Terrorism from a Systems Thinking Perspective"

The authors conclude that terrorist networks are complex systems, and focusing on single variable solutions to breaking up terrorist networks will fail to disrupt them. Systems thinking, on the other hand, focuses on how a particular node in a network interacts with other nodes in the system. Disrupting various connections between key nodes is necessary in order to disrupt the network as a whole into non-functioning status.

Source: 2014-03-06 07:37:09
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Summary of Lisa Livingood's piece "Systems Theory and Military Leadership"

Livingood emphasizes the important function that complex systems thinking can have on improving how military officers think about military problems, specifically within the context of Lieutenant General Rodriguez's experience in Afghanistan as the head of ISAF. The author specifically focuses on the use of "nodes" and "links" can aid a thinker in modeling complex world systems.

Source: 2014-03-06 07:37:45
File: 1394120265.pdf

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Mod: 2014-03-18 16:52:13

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As opposed to how Venkatesh Rao writes long and interesting narratives that have self-driving content, I am very interested in the method that "What If?" uses to respond to his users' interests.

If I received the former in my email inbox as a direct message to only me, it would be a little weird. The latter would be a direct response to a question I sent. The former is perhaps written with a particular <i>type</i> of reader in mind, but not any reader or group of readers in particular, and its voice is actually targeted at the public. The latter is also written with a particular <i>type</i> of reader in mind, but is directly targeted at particular readers. If the readers of a site are allowed to coalesce a particular focus for a writer, then this directedness might be amplified, and be more representative of their interests. This article also explores an interesting perspective on eternal life. From the perspective of finite game theory, eternity doing anything would be hellish. Extending this, the infinite game we currently experience on earth is more interesting, and more heavenly by nature.

Source: 2014-03-07 01:38:52
Proxy: http://feeds.ribbonfarm.com/Ribbonfarm,Content:http://feeds.ribbonfarm.com/~r/Ribbonfarm/~3/lHJI1h4P2nw/
Source Thesis: ribbonfarm Feed

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-24 21:32:35

UnixO: 1393306355

Mod: 2014-03-17 10:46:04

UnixM: 1395078364

Notes from Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange's piece "Ripples of Change in Chinese Foreign Policy? Evidence from Recent Approaches to Nontraditional Waterborne Security"

*China should be more explicit about its objectives and abilities overseas, because "protracted ambiguity can generate uncertainty and suspicion." (Page:94)
*The authors use two case studies in China's activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Mekong River to show how China's foreign policies are changing. (Page:95-96)
*Both internal and external actors keep a close eye on China's foreign policies in order to peer inside its opacity and get a glimpse of its real objectives and abilities. (Page:97)
*Because China's foreign policies have traditionally followed categorical ideology, China now has difficulty justifying innovative or pragmatic foreign policies. (Page:99)
*Because China's system doesn't have checks, balances, or "political release valves," the government suffers from inconsistent messaging. (Page:100)
*China's recent UN voting behavior seems to imply that China's foreign policy is becoming more flexible, but does not provide conclusive proof that China is becoming more interventionist. (Page:100)
*Yan Xuetong, from Tsinghua University, suggests that an adherence to traditional Chinese strategy would allow the Chinese government more flexibility to follow both interventionist and non-interventionist foreign policies, from the perspective that "strict nonintervention actually prevents China from behaving as a morally just great power that can mediate for the greater good." (Page:101)
*China now views its international responsibilities as being best represented in its responses to international events, rather than simply by its economic aid policies. (Page:101,102)
*China felt like it was betrayed by the West after supporting UNSC Resolution 1973, which it accuses the West of using as a pretense for deeper invasion into Libya in 2011; China also lost ~$20 in joint investments because of the Western intervention. (Page:103)
*Johan Lagerkvist holds that China would likely intervene on the sovereign territory of another country if: 1. the UNSC votes on the issues, 2. regional organizations approve intervention, 3. Chinese interests are at risk because of security issues, 4. natural resources that China needs are at risk, or 5. Chinese citizens' lives are endangered.
*Amongst all permanent members of the UNSC, China is now the largest contributor of peacekeeping troops and police forces to the UN since it first deployed them in 1990. (Page:105)
*China increasing maritime reach from regional to blue water regions has only increased the speed with which the PLA(N) is learning and innovating. (Page:108)
*China deployed special operations forces on Somali ground in 2012-07 to conduct a rescue pick-up mission. (Page:109)
*Approval for innovative expansions in military force deployments, like those to the Gulf of Aden, comes quickly from the top levels of the Chinese government, suggesting an appetite for more. (Page:113)
*The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) is how all nations that participate in the Gulf of Aden coalition anti-piracy efforts share information anonymously without appearing to be in league with all other participants. (Page:113)
*China's deployment of police forces to the Mekong River is significant because it represents the first long-term deployment of forces to a foreign country without a UN mandate. (Page:122)

Source: 2014-02-24 21:32:35
File: 1393306355.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-24 22:51:46

UnixO: 1393311106

Mod: 2014-03-15 21:39:45

UnixM: 1394944785

Notes from Wayne Morrison's piece "China-U.S. Trade Issues"

*China's accession into GATT/WTO started in 1986 and took 15 years; China wanted to enter under lenient conditions as a developing country, U.S. wanted China to liberalize. (Page:39)
*Upon accession into the WTO in 2001, China agreed to: 1. reduce average tariffs on industrial and agricultural goods, 2. limit agricultural subsidies, 3. opening its domestic market to foreign enterprises, 4. treating domestic and foreign firms the same within China, 5. removing technology transfer requirements, 6. implementation of basic IPR rules through the WTO's TRIPS, 7. open its banking sector fully to foreign firms by 2006, 8. open its insurance and telecom industries. (Page:39,40)
*USTR report in 2013-12 showed that China still had areas of concern. (Page:40)

Source: 2014-02-24 22:52:07
File: 1393311127.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-24 21:32:35

UnixO: 1393306355

Mod: 2014-03-15 11:16:57

UnixM: 1394907417

Summary of European Council on Foreign Relations's piece "European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014"

This report shows that by making specific foreign policy issues explicit, they can be graded and compared across years, thus providing a framework through which to analyze foreign policy interactions (foreign relations) on specific state-state issues in real time.

Source: 2014-02-24 21:32:50
File: 1393306370.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-01-21 09:21:00

UnixO: 1390324860

Mod: 2014-03-05 22:42:28

UnixM: 1394088148

Summary of Nick Cullather's piece "America’s Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence"

Cullather holds that the allegiance to U.S. objectives that the U.S. and CIA presumed it had bought by supporting Magsaysay's election as the third President of the Philippines is a fallacy; Magsaysay charmed whomever he needed to, including his own people, and rose to the top of his country under his own power. The U.S. largely credits M. with reforming the Philippine army in time to defeat the spread of communism at the hands of the Huks.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:21:00
File: 1390324860.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:21:00

UnixO: 1390324860

Mod: 2014-03-05 22:30:43

UnixM: 1394087443

Summary of Ramon Magsaysay's piece "Roots of Philippine Policy"

Magsaysay describes the origins of the foreign policy of the Philippines, and how the country came to be aligned with the United States against the spread of Communism in SE Asia.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:21:01
File: 1390324861.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:19:21

UnixO: 1390324761

Mod: 2014-03-05 21:00:59

UnixM: 1394082059

Summary of T. N. Harper's piece "Rural Society and Terror"

Harper describes the experience within Malaysia of the Malaysian Emergency period from 1948 to 1960.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:19:21
File: 1390324761.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:19:21

UnixO: 1390324761

Mod: 2014-03-05 20:51:56

UnixM: 1394081516

Summary of Kumar Ramakrishna's piece "Making Malaya Safe for Decolonization: The Rural Chinese Factor in the Counter-Insurgency Campaign"

Ramakrishna asserts that it was not the "New Villages" that kept Malaysia from falling to communists in the twelve years following 1948, but the British promise to provide independence to Malaysia and the voluntary power-sharing with immigrants that the new prospective leaders of Malaysia committed to. The Malaysian Emergency officially ended on 1960-07-31. The primary source of the solution to the emergency was the slow winning of the hearts and minds (HAM) of rural ethnic Chinese and terrorists. The Merdeka Amnesty provided the final push that tipped the rest of the communists over to surrender.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:19:22
File: 1390324762.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:19:21

UnixO: 1390324761

Mod: 2014-03-05 20:35:00

UnixM: 1394080500

Summary of Robert Tilman's piece "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency"

Author argues that those American that looked to the British experience during the "Malaysian Emergency" in Malaysia between 1948-1960 for inspiration in how to win in Vietnam were sorely misguided. The Malaysian Emergency was defined by the spread of Communism from the new PRC and the inspiration the Asian country got from the power of the Japanese. The Briggs Plan, as it was called in Malaysia, resettled vulnerable populations in order to remove them from harmful influence. American leaders naturally took the success of this tactic as inspiration.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:19:24
File: 1390324764.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-12 10:33:23

UnixO: 1389551603

Mod: 2014-03-05 20:20:57

UnixM: 1394079657

Notes from Chapter 30 of Norman Owen's textbook "The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History"

*Brunei declined to join Malaysia in 1963 when it decided to create a large empire for itself. (Page:422)
*Singapore was kicked out of Malaysia in 1965 after the PAP pushed too hard for Singaporean rights in the Malaysian republic. (Page:423)
*Brunei primarily mines the "Seria wells" for its oil and natural gas; it is the third largest producer of oil in SE Asia, and the fourth largest producer of natural gas in the world. (Page:428)
*Brunei's overseas investments produce annual returns that equal the gross total annual outlays of the entire country. (Page:429)
*When Britain left Brunei, some individuals like ethnic Chinese that had been living in Brunei under British-protected citizenship status because stateless after the new Brunei government refused to give them citizenship in the newly independent country. (Page:430)

Source: 2014-01-12 10:33:23
Link: 2014-01-12 12:40:31,Link:2014-01-21 10:41:28,Link:2014-01-22 10:44:41,Link:2014-01-23 19:02:49,Link:2014-01-29 20:18:22,Link:2014-02-06 14:44:36,Link:2014-02-12 21:03:52,Link:2014-02-26 21:32:47

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-27 10:37:36

UnixO: 1393526256

Mod: 2014-02-27 12:05:00

UnixM: 1393531500

Summary of Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper's piece "1948: A Bloody Dawn"

Bayly and Harper describe the pre- to post-WWII experience of Burma, from the withdrawal of the British in face of Japanese invasion, to Aung San's attempt at immediate succession, to the ethnic violence that overwhelmed the country after WWII.

Source: 2014-02-27 10:37:36
File: 1393526256.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-27 10:35:16

UnixO: 1393526116

Mod: 2014-02-27 11:54:22

UnixM: 1393530862

Summary of Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper's piece "1945: The First Wars of Peace"

Bayly and Harper describe the transition of power in Indonesia from Japanese control to the brief, ongoing colonial ambitions of the British and Dutch, to the domestic Indonesian nationalist movement with Sukarno at the head.

Source: 2014-02-27 10:35:16
File: 1393526116.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-12 10:33:23

UnixO: 1389551603

Mod: 2014-02-26 21:32:47

UnixM: 1393479167

Notes from Chapters 19 through 26 of Norman Owen's textbook "The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History"

Chapter 19: The Philippines
*After liberation from the Spanish, the Filipinos started fighting U.S. colonial intentions on 1899-02-04. (Page:285)
-The Philippine Insurrection lasted officially until 1901, but smoldered for longer unofficially. (Page:285)
*William Taft started the "policy of attraction" movement that sought to "charm" the weapons out of Filipino's hands. (Page:285-286)
*The question of when, not if, the Philippines would become independent was mostly assured by 1907. (Page:288)
*Theodore Roosevelt understood how weakly defended the Philippines were, even with the existence of Pearl Harbor, that he developed "War Plan Orange" to prepare to defend the Philippines from the Japanese. (Page:289)
*Corruption filled the gap left behind after the U.S. left in 1946. (Page:291)
-The Philippines chafed under the reality that Japan received more post-war development aid than they did. (Page:292)
*Ramon Magsaysay provided the first charismatic leadership after the first post-independence leader Manuel Roxas died of a heart attack at Clark Air Base. (Page:293)
-Magsaysay died in a plane crash, and was replaced by Ferdinand Marcos, a highly corrupt politician; before he could be replaced after his second term by formal elections, he declared martial law in 1972-09-22, ending the democratic experiment in the Philippines. (Page:294)

Chapter 20: Indonesia
*The political idea of Indonesia only came about in the early 20th century, whereas its geographic name had been around since 1850. (Page:296)
*By 1940, a total of .4% of the population of Indonesia consisted of Europeans mostly living in large cities. (Page:301)
*Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 woke Indonesian's up to the potential power of Asians. (Page:303)
*It was only after Sukarno killed Communists in Madiun in 1948 that the U.S. realized that Sukarno's was not a Communist movement, and thereafter the U.S. put pressure on the Dutch to relinquish its claim on the islands. (Page:308)
-Sukarno chafed under parliamentary democracy, though, and switched to authoritarianism. (Page:309)

Chapter 21: Malaysia
*"Malay reservations" were a government attempt to prevent the exploitation of land-owning Malays by only allowing Malays to sell land to other Malays. (Page:314)
*In response to the ethnic Chinese and Indian claims for Malaysian citizenship, Malaysians responded, "If you get someone in to build your house, you don't ask him to live with you afterward." (Page:316)
*The British tried to re-take Malaysia under the guise of the Malayan Union, but this fell apart quickly, leading to the establishment of the Federation of Malaya on 1948-02-01. (Page:319)
-Thereafter the British acted as mediator during Constitutional bargaining between the three ethnic groups, and Malaya became independent in 1957. (Page:321)

Chapter 22: Burma
*Education was the key to success in British colonial Burma; leadership was not based on hereditary ties, but on education. (Page:324)
*The Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) was the first sign of indigenous Burmese nationalism. (Page:324)
*When the British decided to consider partial independence for India in 1918, the Burmese were worried that Burma would get dragged into being a part of the new India. (Page:325)
-Burma formally separated from India in 1937 after the British gave Burma a partially democratic Constitution. (Page:328)
*Thakin Aung San accompanied the Japanese in their invasion of Burma in 1942-01-00, after which the British retreated to India. (Page:330)
-Aung San was assassinated in 1947-07-19, which led to the break-up of any hope that an inclusive new Burmese government could bring together all ethnic groups in Burma (Burmese, Karen, Kachin, etc.). (Page:332)

Chapter 23: Vietnam
*The French divided Vietnam into three geographic regions: Cochinchina (deep South), Annam (central), and Tonkin (North). (Page:335)
*The French needed indigenous labor to administrate the colony, and used the old Mandarin examination system to recruit quality administrators. (Page:336)
*After 1905, ethnic Vietnamese were fascinated by the power the Japanese showed, and travelled to Japan to learn more. (Page:337)
*When the French started to Westernize the education of the Vietnamese, they also necessarily taught the Vietnamese about the revolutionary history of France, sowing the seeds of their own destruction as a colonial power. (Page:339)
*Confucianism guided Ho Chi Minh's communist ideology: landowners were expected to take care of their tenants, and when the landed started to export rice for their own profit while other Vietnamese were starving, he was none too happy. (Page:342)
*The Japanese overthrew French colonial rule in 1945-03; by the time the French came back in late 1945, the country had returned from Japanese control but was in the hands of communists. (Page:343,344)

Chapter 24: Siam --> Thailand
*Whereas the upper/lower class divisions were clearly visible to the middle class in the early 20th century, Buddhism was a common thread that united the nation as a whole. (Page:350,351)
*Siam changed its name to Thailand in 1939 during the pan-Thai movement. (Page:354)
*Thailand capitulated quickly to Japan in 1941-12-08 in order to avoid being crushed by stampeding elephants; this kept the country largely untouched by war damage. (Page:355)
*The U.S. invested heavily in Thailand infrastructure during the Vietnam War. (Page:358)

Chapter 25: Cambodia
*Cambodian King Norodom resisted French rule in 1885. (Page:361)
*During the French rule, Cambodians were so passive as to be disconcerting to French administrators, who also had very little insight into how Cambodia was administratively structured. (Page:362)

Chapter 26:Laos
*The first idea of Laos was formed as an agreement between the French and Cambodia as a buffer area between the two in 1904. (Page:371)
*The French were bleeding money out in Laos, and their losses were only covered by taxes from their other colonies in Cambodia and Vietnam. (Page:372)
*Laos found itself wrapped up in the Vietnam war and nearly lost its existence; fatigue led Laos to succumb to communist leadership after the U.S. left the region. (Page:375)

Source: 2014-01-12 10:33:23
Link: 2014-01-12 12:40:31,Link:2014-01-21 10:41:28,Link:2014-01-22 10:44:41,Link:2014-01-23 19:02:49,Link:2014-01-29 20:18:22,Link:2014-02-06 14:44:36,Link:2014-02-12 21:03:52

V - internal

Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:56

UnixO: 1390324316

Mod: 2014-02-24 20:47:34

UnixM: 1393303654

Notes from Jean Gelman Taylor's piece "Rearranging Map and Mind: Japan and the Republic in Indonesian Histories"

*Japanese merchants and laborers that had been laying low before WWII in Indonesia brought out their military uniforms after Japan took control from the Dutch. (Page:310)
*Japan controlled Indonesia's media and pumped it full of rhetoric. (Page:311)
-Japan had such strong control of the media that Indonesian leaders didn't know about Japan's loss to the U.S. until well after it had happened; the Indonesian air watch scouts that the Japanese had employed could tell that Allied planes had replaced Japanese ones, and quickly moved to tell Sukarno and the rest of the country. (Page:323)
-Sukarno declared Indonesian independence before the Japanese could even tell Indonesia that it had lost, so that Sukarno and his movement could seem strong. (Page:323)
*Indonesian and Western perceptions of the date of Indonesia's independence differ; the domestic experience was far more tumultuous and longer laster than when the Dutch gave control back to Indonesians. (Page:336)

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:57
File: 1390324317.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:56

UnixO: 1390324316

Mod: 2014-02-24 20:24:40

UnixM: 1393302280

Summary of Jost Dülffer's piece "The Impact of World War II on Decolonization"

Dülffer sets the stage for how WWII began, noting that the British perceived the threat from Japan long before WWII started, (Page:23) and pointing out that the agreement between Germany and Japan in 1942-01-18 was more of a separation of operations than an alliance. (Page:25) He then continues on to describe how Japan proceeded to occupy all of previously colonial SE Asia, and then subsequently how the independence hungry former colonies reacted when the Japanese left a vacuum behind when they lost the war.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:56
File: 1390324316.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-20 11:31:32

UnixO: 1392924692

Mod: 2014-02-20 21:47:32

UnixM: 1392961652

Notes from National Institute of Standards and Technology's piece "Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity"

*This framework establishes a set of guidelines and common practices in order to consolidate domestic and government efforts; potentially applicable to other public/private efforts. (Page:1)
-It is "technology neutral." (Page:4)
*The cybersecurity framework core is divided into five functional actions, inside of which al cyber-related activity can be located: 1. Identify, 2. Protect, 3. Detect, 4. Respond, 5. Recover. (Page:7)
-Each category within each functional unit is assigned a unique identifier like "ID.AM," which refers to the "Asset Management" category within the "Identify" function. (Page:19)
--These are established for "ease of use." (Page:18)

Source: 2014-02-20 11:31:32
File: 1392924692.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-18 12:49:18

UnixO: 1392756558

Mod: 2014-02-20 20:54:12

UnixM: 1392958452

Notes from U.S. Government Accountability Office's piece "U.S.-China Trade: United States Has Secured Commitments in Key Bilateral Dialogues, but U.S. Agency Reporting on Status Should Be Improved"

*The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) are the two highest dialogues held between the US and China about trade and economic issues. (Page:Summary)
*IMPORTANT: "No single document is used to track implementation" of agreements made in high level U.S.-China meetings. (Page:Summary)
-Both parties have been called upon to identify metrics, but neither has done so, citing difficulties in identifying appropriate measures. (Page:Summary)
-Existing reporting mechanisms do "not provide a clear and comprehensive picture of progress across the dialogues." (Page:Summary)
*The first bilateral trade agreement signed between the U.S. and China was in 1979. (Page:2)
*The JCCT was established in 1983, and the S&ED was established in 2009. (Page:4)
-Both of these meetings produce a "fact sheet" as their primary output product, the agreements within which both parties are expected to implement; these fact sheets can also contain lists of "cooperative activities." (Page:5)
-These commitments are either ongoing, or are generally expected to be implemented by the next (yearly) meeting. (Page:10)
-Each agency tracks their own metrics for policy implementation, but no single document fuses them all together. (Page:12)
-Status updates on agreements can come through non-JCCT or S&ED meetings, like WTO meetings. (Page:14)
*Annual reports that deal with U.S.-China trade barriers are released by a wide variety of organizations and do not always cover the same issues. (Page:18)

Source: 2014-02-18 12:49:24
File: 1392756564.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-17 22:12:20

UnixO: 1392703940

Mod: 2014-02-20 20:20:51

UnixM: 1392956451

Notes from U.S. Department of State's piece "Joint Summary of Performance and Financial Information, Fiscal Year 2009"

*This document outlines the "Joint Strategic Goal Framework," which contains 7 Joint Strategic Goals and their subordinate priorities. (Page:6)
*The performance management process consists of four stages: 1. planning and setting goals, 2. collecting data, 3. analyzing data and making use of it, 4. communicating the results to others. (Page:24)
*IMPORTANT: This document correlates both performance and budgeting resources with the 7 strategic goals and priorities identified. (Page:26)

File: 1392703940.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-16 15:49:45

UnixO: 1392594585

Mod: 2014-02-20 20:10:30

UnixM: 1392955830

Notes from Carolyn Wong, Daniel Gonzales, Chad Ohlandt, Eric Landree, and John Hollywood's piece "Using EPIC to Find Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Gaps in Department of Defense Policies"

*The EPIC tool is based on the analysis framework of "Actor --(executes)--> Action --(results in)--> Product. (Page:xii)
-Can output into XML format. (Page:xiv)
-Correctly found 94 percent of Program Manager Roles and Responsibilities statements in 21 policy documents scanned by the EPIC tool. (Page:xiv)
*The R&R of key defense officials is constantly changing, but the downstream effects of these changes and the cognizance of these changes by the key defense officials is difficult. (Page:1)
-The broad R&R of senior defense officials generally comes from the U.S. Code. (Page:2)

Source: 2014-02-16 15:49:45
File: 1392594585.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-10 21:26:42

UnixO: 1392096402

Mod: 2014-02-20 10:37:26

UnixM: 1392921446

Notes from Michael John Garcia's piece "International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law"

*Not all treaties or executive agreements are considered self-executing. (Page:Summary)
-Self-executing treaties are superior to state law, but are equal to federal law and below the authority of the Constitution. (Page:Summary)
*Self-Executing international agreements have the force of law in the U.S. without the need for Congress to enact further domestic implementing legislation. (Page:7)
*IMPORTANT: Document contains a flow diagram for how a treaty and executive agreement are made. (Page:Appendix)

Source: 2014-02-10 21:27:03
File: 1392096423.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:10

UnixO: 1390324270

Mod: 2014-02-19 20:42:34

UnixM: 1392871354

Summary of Kevin Blackburn's piece "Recalling War Trauma of the Pacific War and the Japanese Occupation in the Oral History of Malaysia and Singapore"

Blackburn holds that the survivors of the brutal Japanese occupation in WWII gain strength from the communities with which they shared the experience, but he also notes that each ethnic group experienced--and recalls--the events of the occupation differently.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:10
File: 1390324270.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:10

UnixO: 1390324270

Mod: 2014-02-19 20:35:45

UnixM: 1392870945

Notes from Raymond Callahan's piece "The Illusion of Security: Singapore 1919-42"

*In 1913 the Australians were the first to perceive the danger of a rising Japan and a Great Britain distracted at war in Europe by Germany. (Page:69)
*After WWI, GB was forced to admit that it could no longer be a global naval superpower. (Page:77)
*GB completed a $60 million naval base in Singapore in 1938, but stationed no ships there. (Page:80)
*Churchill offered the use of Singapore to the U.S. in 1940-05 when he realized that he would have to rely on the U.S. to keep Japan at bay; he was forced to reconsider this offer later, but didn't tell the U.S in hopes that they would never need to go there. (Page:81-83)
*On 1941-12-10 HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, sent to reinforce the Naval base in Singapore, were sunk by Japanese air power. (Page:86)
*Churchill chose in 1921 to choose an alliance with the U.S. over that of Japan. (Page:90)
*GB's base in Singapore was a Potemkin Village, a relic of a time when GB power could no longer reach to the edges of its Kingdom. (Page:91)

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:11
File: 1390324271.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:10

UnixO: 1390324270

Mod: 2014-02-19 20:20:51

UnixM: 1392870051

Notes from Cheah Boon Kheng's piece "Japanese Army Policy toward the Chinese and Malay-Chinese Relations in Wartime Malaysia"

*The Singaporean Chinese that joined the British in defending the city were known as the "Dalforce," after the British Commander Lt. Col. John Dalley. (Page:97)
*Kheng holds that relations between the Malay and Chinese worsened as a result of a perception on the part of the Chinese that the Malays had received less-terrible treatment by the Japanese and were therefor collaborators. (Page:107)

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:13
File: 1390324273.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:11:10

UnixO: 1390324270

Mod: 2014-02-19 20:14:39

UnixM: 1392869679

Notes from Hayashi Hirofumi's piece "Massacre of Chinese in Singapore and Its Coverage in Postwar Japan"

*Hirofumi investigates the particulars of the Singapore Massacre of ethnic Chinese in Singapore after the British surrendered to the Japanese on 1942-02-15. (Page:235)
-Even before arriving in Singapore, the policy of Japanese commanders was that any overseas Chinese that resisted Japanese occupation should die. (Page:236)
-The Singapore Massacre was not conducted on a whim, but was the result of a long history of Japanese oppression of ethnic Chinese since their occupation of Manchuria over ten years earlier. (Page:240)
*In the 1960s Japan paid money to Singapore and Malaysia in order to put the killings to rest, and conducted no further acts of atonement or incident research. (Page:242)
*Hirofumi chronicles the various acceptance and denials of whether or not "inhuman acts" took place in the Singapore Massacre, and how the number of dead are still disputed. (Page:243)
*Textbook revisionism started in Japan in 1982 with the softening of words about Japanese actions (e.g. "aggression" to "advance"). (Page:243)
-Led to historical review by Japanese historians and publishing of memoirs, led by Tanaka Hiroshi. (Page:243)
*Textbook revisionism in Japan continues into the 2000s. (Page:245)
-Sources from all three languages (English, Chinese, Japanese) have yet to be consolidated into a single record of what happened in Singapore. (Page:246)

Source: 2014-01-21 09:11:16
File: 1390324276.pdf

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Orig: 2014-02-04 00:07:00

UnixO: 1391501220

Mod: 2014-02-17 21:02:35

UnixM: 1392699755

Notes from Carolyn Wong and Daniel Gonzales's piece "Authority to Issue Interoperability Policy"

*CHSENG is in charge of systems engineering policy oversight; MASE is the study of aligning missions with systems engineering. (Page:xi)
*A "network of guidance relevant to a particular issue" can be created by using three "Three components: citation of authority --> caveats --> party with authority." (Page:xi)
*IMPORTANT: This RAND study provides a basis from which to analyze U.S. Navy policy from a systemic perspective and discover gaps in policy coverage. One of it's primary contributions is to seek to break down DoD policy guidance documents into explicit directives and connect those into a network.
*An existing DoD policy/guidance document must be analyzed and broken down in order to "logically establish the links among the passages and thus weave the passages into a network of guidance relevant to the issue being investigated." (Page:xii)
-From this, a "roles and responsibilities" network can be dynamically created that shows all the authority that any given individual in the network wields. (Page:xii)
-With the framework in place, it is possible for an analyst to determine who is responsible for a particular issue, and whether or not there are overlaps. (Page:xii)
*The study's analysis showed that there are 13 different paths down from various sections of the US Code to separate individuals giving them authority over interoperability policy as it relates to MASE, implying there are significant overlaps in responsibility. (Page:xii)
-The study cites 5 different semantic connections between elemental nodes in its framework: 1. "B cites A directly," 2. "B cites A in References," 3. "A and B in same document," 4. "B not updated to reflect A," (reflects lack of bidirectionality) and 5. "B implies A via text." (Page:xiv)
*RAND developed the Electronic Policy Improvement Capability (EPIC); it allows them to analyze DoD and Navy publications for sentences that relate to roles and responsibilities of specific parties. (Page:2)
-The tools tracks continuity from federal law to DoD publications to Navy publications. (Page:2)
-The tool was built to examine R&R as it relates to interoperability policy, but can be easily extended to other policy areas. (Page:2)
-It can be used to find "areas where multiple agencies have to collaborate to ensure complete and consistent policy." (Page:2)
-The EPIC tools looks for text in policy documents that semantically resembles a "actor (executes) action (resulting in) product" relationships. (Page:7)
*This semantic analysis of the full range of applicable policy documents is helpful in identifying "potential legal conflicts," "dilution of authority," the clarity of "distinct roles and responsibilities," and potential areas of "collaboration among several communities." (Page:50)
*EPIC is a VBA-based tool meant for analyzing text in a MS Office 2003 document. (Page:55)

Source: 2014-02-04 00:08:31
File: 2014-02-16 15:49:45,File:1391501311.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-28 22:57:44

UnixO: 1390978664

Mod: 2014-02-16 11:47:45

UnixM: 1392580065

Notes from U.S. Department of State's piece "The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy"

*NSC is the highest foreign policy-making body in USG. (Page:5)
*DoS and DoD need to collaborate and cooperate from the top-down. (Page:11)
-Need to develop policies that are compatible and fulfill the POTUS NSS. (Page:11)
*Joseph Biden: Congressional support of foreign policy strengthens the national resolve behind its implementation. (Page:16)
*Warren Strobel: U.S. leaders use American news media to communicate messages to foreign leaders when other lines of communication may be cut off. (Page:37)
-Madeleine Albright used the media to convey her foreign policies during the U.S. response to massacres in Sarajevo. (Page:39)
*Audrae Erickson: The best foreign policy lobbyists establish a reputation for being experts on specific foreign policy issues and help craft official U.S. foreign policy. (Page:46)

Source: 2014-01-28 22:57:45
File: 1390978665.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-28 22:57:44

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Mod: 2014-02-16 10:59:56

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Notes from Hillary Clinton's piece "A Citizen's Guide to Foreign Affairs"

*Does a good job of breaking the DoS mission down into key policies like "achieving peace and security" into subcategories/goals like "transnational crime." (Page:3)
-It then does a great job of making clear that within "achieving peace and security," there are 29 indicators that make up DoS/USAID performance ratings, further identifying whether or not those indicators are "above target," or "improved, but target not met," etc. (Page:4)
*The White House OMB asked Executive departments to identify high-priority performance goals (HPPGs) as part of the President's performance agenda development process. (Page:5)
-Doesn't fuse metrics that departments/agencies have in common
*SECSTATE is POTUS principal foreign policy advisor (Page:7)

File: 1390978664.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-28 22:16:10

UnixO: 1390976170

Mod: 2014-02-15 10:50:11

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Summary of United Nations's piece "Statement of Treaties and International Agreements: Registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat during the month of May 2013"

Contains individually numbered lists of items that denote specific agreements between states; each item also contains meta data about the time put into force and the time registered with the UN, along with other explanatory data.

Source: 2014-01-28 22:16:10https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/Monthly%20Statement/2013/05/monstate.pdf
Source Thesis: Google

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Orig: 2014-01-20 18:20:48

UnixO: 1390270848

Mod: 2014-02-15 08:49:49

UnixM: 1392482989

Notes from Ely Ratner's piece "(Re)Defining the “New Type of Major Country Relationship” between the United States and China"

*The U.S. has responded to China's call for a “new type of major country relationship” by echoing their policy, but this is leading to misperceptions about U.S. intentions; other countries in Asia are wondering whether the U.S. will accommodate Chinese bad behavior, which could lead to further miscalculation or assertiveness on the part of China.
-As a solution to this misunderstanding, the U.S. should: 1. make its interpretation of the concept explicit and work to build CBMs and reduce risk, 2. link Chinese behavior to its words and make the disconnect explicit, 3. get China to extend this use of its catchphrase to other great powers in the region like Japan, and 4. re-conceptualize the verbiage "new type of relationship" to make it more suitable for U.S. audiences.

Source: 2014-01-20 18:21:03
File: 1390270863.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-24 19:14:15

UnixO: 1390619655

Mod: 2014-02-14 12:59:51

UnixM: 1392411591

Notes from The Korea Herald's piece "U.S. Updating N.K. Contingency Plans: Pacific Commander (Korea Herald)"

*Admiral Locklear on the importance of explicit foreign policy signaling and communication: "Meanwhile, he stressed the need to establish a key military communication channel with China. 'I don’t have the ability to pick up a phone and talk directly to a PLA navy admiral or general at the time of a crisis. And we need to work on that.' He added he is concerned about the growing risk of conflict between China and Japan, stuck in territorial stand-offs. 'Any time you have two large powers, two large economic powers, two large military powers that have a disagreement that they’re not talking to each other about that has no clear diplomatic end-state in sight ... the risk calculation can grow,' he said."

Source: 2014-01-24 19:14:15
Content: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140124000473
Source Thesis: U.S. Pacific Command Regional News Feed

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Orig: 2014-01-24 04:23:06

UnixO: 1390566186

Mod: 2014-02-14 12:06:17

UnixM: 1392408377

Notes from Bill Gates's piece "3 Myths That Block Progress for the Poor"

*Transparency improves resource allocation: "The Internet is making it easier for citizens to know what their government should be delivering—like how much money their health clinic should get—so they can hold officials accountable. As public knowledge goes up, corruption goes down, and more money goes where it’s supposed to."

Source: 2014-01-27 00:31:26
Content: http://annualletter.gatesfoundation.org/?cid=bg_fb_po0_012103/#section=home
Source Thesis: Gmail

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:10:07

UnixO: 1390324207

Mod: 2014-02-13 12:06:27

UnixM: 1392321987

Summary of Ian Brown's piece "Rural Distress in Southeast Asia during the World Depression of the Early 1930s: A Preliminary Reexamination"

Brown holds that the post-Depression economic downturn in SE Asia was not as traumatic to SE Asians as it commonly assumed; he conducts his analysis using economic indicators and presuming the impacts on the acceptability of local living standards. He also asserts that not all of SE Asia suffered in the same way, or to the same extent.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:10:10
File: 1390324210.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:10:07

UnixO: 1390324207

Mod: 2014-02-13 11:45:34

UnixM: 1392320734

Summary of Anne Booth's piece "Four Colonies and a Kingdom: A Comparison of Fiscal, Trade, and Exchange Rate Policies in South East Asia in the 1930s"

In comparing the SE Asian economic slump in the 1930s to that of the 1990s, Booth points out that SE Asia was still under the economic thumb of colonial powers in the former and didn't have as much say in its economic policies as it did in the 1990s; this, in addition to being severely dependent upon external economic forces, made the crisis of the 1930s worse than the latter crisis. Thailand survived the 1930s depression better than other SE Asian economies because it was largely internally subsistent and mostly debt-free, despite being economically dependent on exports to European powers.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:10:08
File: 1390324208.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:10:07

UnixO: 1390324207

Mod: 2014-02-13 11:38:32

UnixM: 1392320312

Summary of Christopher Baker's piece "Economic Reorganization and the Slump in South and Southeast Asia"

Baker holds that 1930 is a dividing line between the economic prosperity in SE Asia brought about by the opening of the Suez Canal, and that the growth wrought in SE Asia was desperately dependent upon continued outside intervention by European traders.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:10:07
File: 1390324207.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-12 10:33:23

UnixO: 1389551603

Mod: 2014-02-12 21:03:52

UnixM: 1392267832

Notes from Chapter 18 of Norman Owen's piece "The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History"

Chapter 18: Depression and War
*Economic prosperity in SE Asia increased rapidly in the first twenty years of the 20th century, to the point that SE Asians started to feel the injustice they were being treated with, and then the Great Depression happened, followed shortly after by WWII and Japanese occupation. (Page:268)
-Exports dropped, and the capital that used to flow into the region now flowed out because the ultimate source of the capital, British banks, was hard-hit by the Depression; this impoverished much of SE Asia. (Page:269)
-With no income, rents and taxes were unsustainable at their previous levels, and colonizers that still demanded old debts were increasingly rebelled against. (Page:271)
-It was the colonizers, not the peasants, that completely lost their livelihood; the peasants could still make their own food or buy it at cheaper prices. (Page:271)
*The Japanese colonial period was the first time that SE Asia as a whole had been afflicted by the same blight all at once. (Page:272)
-Japanese moved so quickly to take SE Asia in part because they were worried that the Germans, still winning decisively in 1940, would commandeer European SE Asian colonies from their defeated foes. (Page:274)
*As the war turned against Japan in the middle of 1942, Japan increasingly tried to charm SE Asians into cooperation by giving them more say in their rule. (Page:276)

Source: 2014-01-12 10:33:23
Link: 2014-01-12 12:40:31,Link:2014-01-21 10:41:28,Link:2014-01-22 10:44:41,Link:2014-01-23 19:02:49,Link:2014-01-29 20:18:22,Link:2014-02-06 14:44:36

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Orig: 2014-01-20 18:20:48

UnixO: 1390270848

Mod: 2014-02-12 13:05:54

UnixM: 1392239154

Notes from Barack Obama's piece "Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence"

*Increasing explicitness of foreign policies increases trust: "For that reason, the new presidential directive that I've issued today will clearly prescribe what we do, and do not do, when it comes to our overseas surveillance." *Trust is an innate requirement in coordination between states: ”And I’ve instructed my national security team, as well as the intelligence community, to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our coordination and cooperation in ways that rebuild trust going forward.”
*The world is changing quickly, and it needs systems that are capable of adapting accordingly: ”For ultimately, what’s at stake in this debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines, or passing tensions in our foreign policy. When you cut through the noise, what’s really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speed.”
*China and Russia cannot be trusted in the same way that the U.S. can: ”No one expects China to have an open debate about their surveillance programs, or Russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account.”

Source: 2014-01-20 18:21:24
File: 1390270884.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-15 16:51:14

UnixO: 1389833474

Mod: 2014-02-12 08:05:27

UnixM: 1392221127

Notes from Shinji Yamaguchi's piece "Is China’s Social Unrest the Source of Its Foreign Policy? A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Domestic Instability on External Relations"

*James Fearon: Audience cost theory claims that changes in foreign policy are more politically costly in democratic political systems, and are thus less likely to be changed and therefore more reliable. (Page:23)
*Jessica Weeks: Audience costs can also be high in political systems with factionalized elite groups because foreign policy change that leads to foreign policy failure (accountability) also subsequently leads to individuals being removed from power; this cost is higher in institutionalized single-party governments than it is in dictatorships. (Page:23-24)
*David Shambaugh: "authoritarian resilience" is keeping the CPC alive where the Soviet system failed. (Page:26)
*Bruce Dickson: the "Lipset hypothesis" is wrong because the CPC has co-opted private business and successfully integrated both political and economic elites. (Page:26)
*Ryosei Kokubun: the "party-state corporatism" system satisfies the desires of private business while strengthening the legitimacy of the one-party government. (Page:27)
*Jean-Pierre Cabestan: "enlightened but plutocratic authoritarianism." (Page:27)
*The national government improves its image amongst the peasants by demonizing local governments at the village and township level (those sectors of society with which the peasants interact most frequently). (Page:28)
*David Lampton: Chinese policy-making since the 1990s is defined by increases in specialization, multipolarization, decentralization, and globalization, implying that increased complexity requires elites to broaden their base of consensus in the government. (Page:30-31)
*In order to harmonize top-down and bottom-up foreign policy in the CPC, small leading groups are taking an increasingly important role. (Page:32)

Source: 2014-01-15 16:51:20
File: 1389833480.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-05 19:40:47

UnixO: 1388979647

Mod: 2014-02-11 11:10:52

UnixM: 1392145852

Notes from United States Government's piece "National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for The National Strategy for Maritime Security"

*IMPORTANT: The statement at the top of this document that states how this document fits in with other strategic documents is good, especially its linkages with PPD-18, but it is difficult to identify how important it is within the larger context of all other Navy guiding documents. (Page:ii)

Source: 2014-01-05 19:40:48
File: 1388979648.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-05 19:40:47

UnixO: 1388979647

Mod: 2014-02-11 11:00:30

UnixM: 1392145230

Notes from Thomas Waldhauser's piece "Joint Doctrine Note 2-13: Commander's Communication Synchronization"

*A failure to communicate can allow an enemy to either "exploit or monopolize" what the media reports. (Page:vi)
*The military perceives the Commander's Communication Synchronization (CCS) to be the harmonization of "operations, actions, words, and images," and all these messages must make it from the top at the USG level to the very bottom. (Page:vii-viii)
*Policy and strategy guidance should be in all planning documents: "USG strategic narrative and themes should be included in the documents that direct planning, such as a warning order, alert order, or the Guidance for Employment of the Force." (Page:x)
*"Strategies, policies, plans, and actual joint force operations communicate
national intent in ways that confirm or conflict with what we want the audience to believe." (Page:I-1)
*CCS should allow for decentralized action: "The commander’s approach to synchronizing communication emphasizes early planning, training, and guidance that enables decentralized, yet responsive action that reflect strategic guidance. " (Page:I-12)
*Whereas trust is something given by an individual, credibility is a more general term that describes how aligned a person or organization's actions, words and images are. (Page:I-14)
*A USFK slide on "Strategic Communications Visualized" shows how the communication of a CDR's policies and strategies are harmonized during the "communications planning" phase, which then leads to a consistent message across the spectrum of public and private communications channels; the problem is that the assessment arrow connects feedback from the public back into the "communications planning" phase and ignores the possibility that policies and strategies should be flexible as well. (Page:I-16)
*In order to evaluate feedback from the public, the U.S. Military is forced to conduct searches for things like "Haiti + Earthquake + U.S. Military." (Page:I-18)
*The United States EUCOM Senior Leader Engagement Portal is a good concept, demonstrating how to display the full array of strategic communications within the AOR all at once in a distributed and accessible manner. (Page:II-11)
*CCS necessitates a cross-functional working group because of all the stakeholders involved. (Page:II-12)
*Strategic USG documents provide an enduring, static message from which to plan subordinate operations: "Strategic documents, like the NSS, provide a USG communication, set within a contextual background, and help identify the USG ultimate goal or end state. This enduring communication, with context and end state, is often called a “narrative.” " (Page:III-9)
*Within the context of linking policy to strategy, USFK links "Strategic Narrative" to "Campaign Plan Enduring Themes." (Page:III-12)
*IMPORTANT: The DoS INFOCENTRAL (at https://infocentral.state.gov, login required) provides a centralized place for senior leaders to see "blessed" strategic messages ("serves as a central repository for vetted senior leader statements, talking points, research, analysis, and other products for use by interagency partners at all levels"); why is this behind a login? (Page:III-13)
*USG strategies provide a framework for subordinate action: "Strategic objectives originate from the National Security Staff and are passed through the DOD, typically by the USD(P) and the ASD(PA). These strategic objectives provide USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core themes under which the DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities." (Page:B-2)
-OSD is the integration point with the JOPP process at the COCOM level: "The OSD and JS provide guidance to the CCMDs for development of the TCP, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan contingency planning tasking, or a WARNORD that directs crisis action planning. These products trigger the first step, “Initiation,” of the JOPP." (Page:B-2)
*Causality is easier to determine in a closed system. (Page:B-31)
*A message map is a good way to visualize policy/strategy linkages: "The message map is a graphic which provides the organizational narrative in the center, key themes branching out, then specific messages and facts supporting and branching out further from the themes. It provides a quick reference to speak, discuss, and answer questions about who they are, what they are currently doing, how they do it, why, and specific facts to support the messaging." (Page:C-1)
-It shows linkages between policies and outcomes and can be organized: Themes -> Objectives -> "How we are doing it" -> "How we are doing so far." (Page:C-2)

Source: 2014-01-05 19:40:47
File: 1388979647.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-05 19:40:47

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Mod: 2014-02-11 09:51:54

UnixM: 1392141114

Notes from American Foreign Service Association's piece "The Foreign Policy Advisor Program"

*Since the days of General Eisenhower and President Roosevelt, POLADs have provided the official mouthpiece for State Department advice to senior military and political leaders. (Page:3)
*There are currently 90 FSOs participating from the State Department side, and there is a demand signal for more. (Page:6)
-They provide bureaucratic enmeshment, and provide a formalized linkage between State, Defense, and the embassy country team. (Page:6-7)
*Since POLADs work so closely with senior military officials, their personalities should be matched so as not to create personal conflict. (Page:10)
*Even though the existence of such exchanges is a direct outcropping of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some of the most interesting and productive exchanges between POLADs and members of the military have been at the very junior, O-1 to O-2 level. (Page:11)

Source: 2014-01-05 19:40:50
File: 1388979650.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-01-21 09:09:14

UnixO: 1390324154

Mod: 2014-02-10 17:52:26

UnixM: 1392083546

Summary of Nobutaka Suzuki's piece "Upholding Filipino Nationhood: The Debate over Mindanao in the Philippine Legislature, 1907–1913"

Suzuki claims that Philippine claims on Mindanao were only started once America had engendered a sense of Philippine sovereignty over all the Philippine islands in their colonial drive to control the entire archipelago, either as one piece or as multiple nations. It was only once the US tried to colonize Mindanao separately from the Philippines as a whole that the Filipino parliament (primarily Christians in Manila) began to vehemently proclaim the territorial integrity of the Philippines as a whole, inclusive of the Muslims in Mindanao.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:09:14
File: 1390324154.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:09:14

UnixO: 1390324154

Mod: 2014-02-10 17:40:55

UnixM: 1392082855

Summary of Jean Gelman Taylor's piece "Many Kingdoms, One Colony: Bringing Indonesian Histories Together"

Taylor describes in this chapter of her book how between 1850 and the early 1900s Indonesians increasingly integrated Western ways of life into their culture, but by the end of that period there were louder and louder calls for a return to traditional, Muslim-based ways of life that brought back the old "inherited privilege" systems of leadership while still keeping the benefits of Western technology, innovation, and the educational systems that were required to participate in the larger global economy as it existed at the time, but separate from colonial rule.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:09:15
File: 1390324155.pdf

V - internal

Orig: 2014-01-21 09:08:19

UnixO: 1390324099

Mod: 2014-02-10 11:13:39

UnixM: 1392059619

Summary of Eric Tagliacozzo's piece "Ambiguous Commodities, Unstable Frontiers: The Case of Burma, Siam, and Imperial Britain, 1800-1900"

Tagliacozzo argues that the relationship between Great Britain, Burma and Siam between the beginnings of the 19th and 20th centuries was greatly influence by three factors: politics, illegal trade goods, and frontier borders. He holds that Burma was unfortunately closer to Britain's existing trade empire than Siam was, which led to Burma's subjugation and Siam's continued independence from colonial rule. That being said, a great majority of Siam's economic livelihood depended upon trade with Great Britain.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:08:19
File: 1390324099.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-21 09:08:19

UnixO: 1390324099

Mod: 2014-02-10 10:39:39

UnixM: 1392057579

Summary of Carl Trocki's piece "Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries"

Trocki describes the transition from weak colonial administrative rule in SE Asia in the early 19th century to unquestionable colonial ownership of most of SE Asia by the 1930s. He also notes that the rise of SE Asian nationalism was already firmly underway before WWII started.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:08:20
File: 1390324100.pdf

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Orig: 2014-01-12 10:33:23

UnixO: 1389551603

Mod: 2014-02-06 14:44:36

UnixM: 1391726676

Notes from Chapter 14 of Norman Owen's textbook "The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia: A New History"

Chapter 14: Colonial Power and State Authority
*By changing the governing structure of the societies they co-opted, the colonizers in SE Asia were sowing the seeds of their own eventual downfall. (Page:201)
-Government was judged more by its economic success than its respect of its citizens. (Page:202)
-At the same time as changing the governmental structures, the colonizers were also re-drawing the map of SE Asia and solidifying its boundaries. (Page:204)
*Economic change also necessitated increasing levels of intrusiveness from government. (Page:209)
-In order to manage these economies, a civil servant class to keep track of all the paperwork was necessary, and grew exponentially in the Western colonies and Siam; colonizers used locals to fill these positions in order to train them in how to run the colony and because they were cheap labor. (Page:210-211)
--Civil service increasingly became an attractive ticket to the newly burgeoning middle class in SE Asia. (Page:212)
*Written and codified new colonial (Western) law deposed the previously flexible systems called <i>adat</i> that allowed societies formalized rules to change flexibly over time. (Page:217)

Source: 2014-01-12 10:33:23
Link: 2014-01-12 12:40:31,Link:2014-01-21 10:41:28,Link:2014-01-22 10:44:41,Link:2014-01-23 19:02:49,Link:2014-01-29 20:18:22

V - internal

Orig: 2014-02-06 11:34:00

UnixO: 1391715240

Mod: 2014-02-06 12:00:32

UnixM: 1391716832

Summary of Jussi Hanhimaki's book "The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy"

Hanhimaki's primary point appears to be that Kissinger's back-door methods of diplomacy did not fit in with US ideology in the post-Watergate era; he lacked "rapport with the American public" and the ability to sell a foreign policy to them. He does consent that Kissinger spent much of his time in office pursuing peace rather than war.

Source: 2014-02-06 11:34:00:Hard Copy

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Orig: 2014-02-06 09:17:00

UnixO: 1391707020

Mod: 2014-02-06 11:33:04

UnixM: 1391715184

Notes from Henry Kissinger's book "Does America Need a Foreign Policy?"

*The American public's lack of concern about foreign policy issues is luring American politicians into a false sense of security about the importance of economics in solving all problems; Kissinger warns that we must focus more on the "political, cultural, and spiritual impact" of America's rise. (Page:18-19)
*The American sense of inevitability towards its victory in the Cold War has led it to equate "social policy" with "foreign policy." (Page:19)
*The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, a result of the Thirty Years' War, codified the current system of sovereignty and domestic non-interference that we have today. (Page:21)
-This Westphalian consensus is being challenged by an increasing movement towards UN intervention in foreign countries under the auspices of "universal humanitarian intervention" and "universal jurisdiction." (Page:21)
*The US Congress "legislates the tactics of foreign policy." (Page:27)
-Whereas diplomatic communiques seek dialogue between states, legislation is closer to an "ultimatum." (Page:27)
*There may be more travel than ever between different parts of the world, but rarely do travelers emerge outside of the contextual cocoons in which they travel (business, government, etc.). (Page:35)
*There is a US conflict of interest in the balance between the EU and NATO: once European powers in the EU decide on a course of action that might involve NATO, a decision has already been made that the US would find hard to leverage against in NATO, effectively committing US resources through NATO towards EU objectives. (Page:61-62)
*Japan is controlled not by personality leaders, but by consensus upon ideas; only the ideas, national policies, and regulations last longer than any Japanese administration, and only ideas (not Western personality leaders) can influence Japanese ideas. (Page:122)
*America would isolate itself if it declared China to be an enemy based solely on China's increasing economic prosperity and ideologies. (Page:135)
*The US and China came together in 1971 not out of ideological optimism, but because of a common threat. (Page:140)
*The Clinton administration upgraded the US-China relationship first to "engagement," and then to "strategic partnership;" neither of these broad statements, however, is enough to give the US-China relationship a sense of direction. (Page:145)
*Chinese nationalism is more dangerous to the US than Chinese Communism is. (Page:146)
*Between the US and China: "A permanent dialogue is needed as the best means to create a more stable world or, at a minimum, to demonstrate to the American people and America's allies why it is not possible." (Page:149)
*US interests are best served by keeping "constructive relationships" on the table and not declaring any single state to be an enemy; this needs to be balanced with a superior level of military presence. (Page:160-161)
*The purpose of the Treaty of Westphalia was to separate domestic from foreign policy and to separate the region inside a country from the influence of that which might try to come from outside. (Page:236)
*In the 19th century Americans hailed the universality of their own system, but tended towards isolationism in order to protect its system from outside influence. (Page:239)
*The US uses unilateral domestic legislation (sanction) to try to influence the domestic inner-workings of foreign countries like China, as evidenced by Nancy Pelosi statement: "Hopefully at the end of this 12 months, if there is freedom of the press in China and the other human rights conditions are met, then we can begin to solve some of the other problems that members of Congress have." (Page:252)
*As it relates to the conduct of foreign relations, the gap between the amount of information available and the ability to turn it into applicable knowledge is greater than ever. (Page:284)
*The US needs to figure out how to turn the computer from an information processing system into one that can help us visualize the future. (Page:286)
*The only reason the British Empire survived where Rome did not is because Great Britain dissolved its power before it could be destroyed; likewise, a single-minded quest for US hegemony would destroy America. (Page:287)
*The US needs to "transform its power into moral consensus, promoting its values not by imposition but by their willing acceptance." (Page:288)

Source: 2014-02-06 09:17:00
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Notes from Henry Kissinger's piece "On China"

*The Chinese writing system is old, but consistent; despite millennia of separation, modern Chinese can learn lessons from the ancients. (Page:6)
*Despite its vulnerability to invading barbarians from all sides, ancient China survived by deterring invasion in clever ways and ensuring that barbarian tribes did not form alliances. (Page:20)
-They used "barbarians to attack barbarians" and ruled outsiders with "a loose rein." (Page:20)
*The Qing empire failed to look outside itself and craft a foreign policy based on a full knowledge of the external environment that was steadily encroaching upon its doorstep. (Page:32)
-China's lack of humility towards British envoys would be its downfall. (Page:57)
*Wei Yuan wanted to use foreign barbarians to defeat the British barbarians that were threatening it, but since they had no envoys overseas, they had no understanding of all the barbarians. (Page:62)
*A diplomatic option was never considered by any of the parties in the lead up to Chinese involvement in the Korean War. (Page:143)
*Mao made use of "overlapping hostilities" to control the Soviet Union and the US to his advantage. (Page:148)
-Mao had a habit of taking the most unexpected option when given a range of strategic choices. (Page:154)
*Communiques normally have limited long-term utility, but the Shanghai Communique had a life far beyond the near-term because it defined a "direction" rather than a "mood." (Page:267)
-US-Chinese ideological conversion on the refusal to allow the hegemony of any state in the Asia-Pacific region was the most significant agreement in the first communique. (Page:270)
-US-Chinese rapprochement created an "opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent and to mitigate differences where they existed." (Page:274)
*Of the Chinese decision to start a third war in Vietnam: "maniacal Vietnamese nationalism" draws foreign powers to interfere in Vietnam. (Page:341)
*Up to 5,000 jobs change hands in the transition between US Presidential administrations, and it takes about 9 months for things to settle down. (Page:377)
*As opposed to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaopeng, Jiang Zemin understood that China needed to cooperate with the international system and also had the political capital and leeway to make it happen. (Page:450)
*Kissinger: Whereas George Bush understood the importance of avoiding direct intervention in Chinese self-government, Bill Clinton overtly challenged Chinese leadership with assertions that China's leadership would eventually lose to democracy. (Page:461)
*The three communiques between US and China were a "tacit bargain" upon which normalization was built. (Page:471)
*By the time of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, no high-level meetings had taken place between the US and China since 1989. (Page:475)
*Even the depth of Chinese history has no precedent for how China should behave in a codependent international system. (Page:481)
*After Jiang Zemin transitioned out of power, the most important topic of discussion between the US and China was no longer <i>that</i> a relationship existed, but how to go about dealing with the reality of it. (Page:487)
*In 19th century Europe, diplomacy was highly elastic until the reunification of Germany forced countries to strictly align with each other. (Page:516)
*Kissinger describes the most beneficial possible relationship between the US and China not as being a "partnership," but as being a "co-evolution;" both countries should "pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict." (Page:526)
-Co-evolution should be established at three levels: 1. high level discussions that can mitigate crises, 2. increasingly comprehensive issue-focused frameworks (like North Korea), 3. the creation of a "Pacific Community." (Page:527-528)
--IMPORTANT: Should be based on the "elaboration" of "shared purposes." (Page:528)
--US and Chinese leaders need to transcend the variability of the "mood of the moment" by developing a "pattern of actions capable of surviving inevitable changes of circumstance." (Page:529)

Source: 2014-02-05 22:18:00
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Notes from Michael Hunt's book "The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy"

*There are a multitude of historical experiences in Chinese history, not all of them either solely hegemonic or solely peaceful:
-The Qin (not Qing) dynasty that started at the end of the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.) is still looked back upon with admiration despite being a period of hegemonic aspirations by the ultimately successful first Qin emperor. (Page:6)
-In the presence of foreign invaders in the Jin (265-420 A.D.) and Yuan (1271-1368 A.D.) dynasties, Chinese managed to make due and survive. (Page:7)

Source: 2014-02-05 21:52:00
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Notes from Denny Roy's book "China's Foreign Relations"

*Chinese history influences current Chinese decisions, and neo-realism does not account for this "iterated game" view. (Page:4)
*Chinese foreign relations can fit into three periods: 1. revolutionary (1949-1970s), 2. "strategic triangle" (1970s to 1980s), 3. "open door" (1980s onward). (Page:13-14)
*On 1950-10-02 China told Indian ambassador K. M. Panikkar that China didn't care if South Korean soldiers invaded North Korea, but it would resist if Americans did. (Page:18)
*Even when China deviates from its own stated policies, it has a history of denying reality: stationed troops in Vietnam, but denied stationing troops abroad. (Page:39)
*Perhaps moreso than other states, China's domestic and foreign policies are linked because of the reliance of the CCP on internal legitimacy in order to continue operations. (Page:44)
*China fears the rise of "pan-islamicism" because of its potentially disruptive role in the balance of international power and Xinjiang in particular. (Page:51)
*The Chinese have refined "feigned compliance" to domestic regulation to such an extent that it has become an "art form." (Page:55)
*US SECSTATE John Foster Dulles coined the term "peaceful evolution" to describe how the US intended to reshape countries slowly in its own image. (Page:57)
*The number of links that China must maintain with the outside world precludes the management of China's foreign affairs by a small group, let alone a single leader. (Page:66)
*IMPORTANT: Quansheng Zhao holds that China's shift from a vertically controlled foreign policy to a horizontally-operated foreign policy degraded the coherency of China's foreign policies. (Page:66)
*According to Quansheng Zhao, in the midst of a top-level detente between the US and China after the Tienanmen Massacre, mayor of major Chinese cities travelled to the US and met with the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, the National Security Adviser, and DEPSECSTATE. (Page:67)
*There are severe ideological differences in the elites in the CCP; conservatives are highly wary of the potentially polluting aspect of contact with the outside world. (Page:67)
*China got MFN status from the US in 1979, and the US gradually reduced COCOM restrictions until China was a "friendly, non-allied" trading partner by 1983-05. (Page:87)
*The US claims that its Jackson-Vanik Amendment is a higher authority than the WTO MFN status, and reserves the right to refuse MFN to any state that does not live up to a high human rights bar. (Page:95)
*China has taken advice received from the International community through its economics institutions and used it to bolster it own domestic arguments against political opponents. (Page:98)
*Chinese internal debates have concluded that in order to protect China's economic development, China must go out to engage the enemy rather than lure him in as Sun Tzu might have suggested. (Page:127)
*Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin sign an official agreement to limit the number of troops both sides could station along their shared borders. (Page:132)
*China does a reasonable job publishing its foreign policies, but often does so in a lyrical way (i.e. "The Four Nots"). (Page:141)
*IMPORTANT: China shifted its position towards arms control agreements; it was first against, them, but shifted dramatically towards participation because of 1. Beijing wants to write the rules it must live by, and 2. China cares about the image it would project if it continued to abstain on arms controls. (Page:149)
-Critics cite how China has been double-talking and not following its own policies. (Page:149)
-In an uncharacteristic "acquiescence to foreign pressure," China signed the CTBT by 1996 after the US and Russia signed, but not without some kicking and screaming. (Page:151)
*China does not have a broad policy towards Asia as a whole, only bilateral policies with specific countries. (Page:158)
*Chinese foreign policies tend to be "self serving" and "ruthless." (Page:229)
*Liberal view: "Beijing is unable to conceal policies that violate international norms," and changes it behavior accordingly or feels the urge to defend its actions. (Page:231)
*China's foreign policy-making has proven to be irrational, because it appears to be unable to follow a consistent foreign policy over extended periods of time; the source of this inconsistency is unclear. (Page:245)

Source: 2014-02-05 21:50:00
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Notes from Lu Ning's piece "The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China"

*China's governing system has three "vertical systems:" 1. CCP, 2. Government, and 3. Military; the POLITBURO sits at the top of all these. (Page:7)
-All three vertical systems have five levels: 1. Central, 2. Provincial (Army as a whole), 3. Prefectural (Division level in Army), 4. County (Regimental level), and 5. Township (Battalion level). (Page:7)
*Ultimate power in the CPC rested at the level of a single individual at the top, through the leadership of Jiang Zemin. (Page:9)
*The Politburo is too large and cumbersome to make real-time foreign policy decisions, so they are left up to the Standing Committee. (Page:9)
*The CPC Secretariat held the decision-making position that the Politburo currently does up until 1956. (Page:11)
*The CPC Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group takes the lead on all foreign policy issues. (Page:12)
*The highest level groups in the CPC try to make decisions by consensus, and will meet and confer repeatedly until they can get it; if no consensus is found, the primary leader ("paiban") will make the decision; all opinions are recorded. (Page:19)
-These top groups rarely hold votes; generally, once the primary has made his opinion known, the others fall in line. (Page:19)
*The MFA administratively reports to the State Council, but operationally it reports to the leader of the CPC Foreign Affairs LSG. (Page:25)
-The MFA bureaucracy contains: 1. a General Office, 2. a Foreign Affairs Management Department, 3. 16 external affairs departments (can be regional or functional), and 4. 8 internal affairs departments. (Page:26)
-An external department is in charge of a region, and typically contains divisions that are in charge of specific countries or long-vision research or domestic communications. (Page:27)
*The 4th Division of the Information Department (ID4D) is the primary conduit through which information flows into and out of the MFA. (Page:28)
-The ID4D has a 24-hour news watch, and if anything of great importance happens they need to report it to the 24-hour watch of the General Office Secretariat. (Page:29-30)
-The ID4D watches CNN and produces the Xin Qingkuang (Jianbao) (New Developments (Brief)). (Page:30)
*China has at least two classifications: "strictly secret" and "top secret." (Page:31)
*As opposed to sending diplomatic cables by diplomatic courier, sending them by cable ensures that higher party leadership (like division chiefs) will read them. (Page:33)
*Since foreign policy decisions are arrived at by consensus, the only way for "losing" negotiators to maintain freedom of action is to make sure that the language of foreign policy directives is ambiguous and "interpretable." (Page:40)
*China offered an olive branch to the US in the early part of the Korean War through the Soviets, but it was rejected on 1950-09-01. (Page:88)
*The only warnings that China gave to the U.S. about its intentions if the U.S. crossed the 38th parallel were through the Indian and Burmese ambassadors, and only mentioned how China would respond if the U.S. insisted on "expanding the war" or "subjecting its neighbors to wanton aggression;" Mao held out hope that he might not have to intervene up until 1950-09-28, and MacArthur pushed across the 38th Parallel on 1950-09-30. (Page:89)
-The UN resolution on 1950-10-07 that allowed UN forces to occupy the whole peninsula made up Mao's mind to intervene. (Page:89)
*Nixon made the first moves towards Rapprochement by removing U.S. restrictions on travel and commerce with Communist China. (Page:91)
*It was only after the death of Mao that foreign policy decision-making was finally opened up to more than a single person again, the first time since Mao consolidated government control in the mid-1960s. (Page:95)
*IMPORTANT: The New Zealand/China nuclear weapons on visiting US warships incident (Hu Yaobang misspoke) ("no confirmation, no denial" policy) highlights the importance of a static, official U.S. opinion that cannot be mistaken by a single public official. (Page:100)
*China declared the independence of its foreign policy in 1982. (Page:121)
*Whereas the MFA processes external material, the Xinhua News Agency (with its departments around the globe) creates raw intel; this has led senior CPC leadership to trust MFA sources more than domestic ones. (Page:127)
*Academic institutions have little impact on CFP because: 1. party leaders don't trust academics to follow the party line, 2. they don't provide clear policy choices, 3. they take too long to be relevant in real time to policy-makers. (Page:145)
*China's foreign policy focus has been on economic development since the late 1970s. (Page:174)
*Chinese foreign policy frameworks:
-1. Classical school: China as a rational actor that seeks maximum utility; also focuses on the opinions and decisions of elites (Page:183-185)
-2. Institutional school: focuses on how the structure of the decision-making machine affects decision outcomes (Page:187)
*Institutionalized foreign policy decision-making, as opposed to strong-man or centralized foreign policy decision-making, produces foreign policies that are more "rational and pragmatic, and more predictable," albeit slower (Page:192)

Source: 2014-02-05 08:58:00
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Notes from Marc Lanteigne's book "Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction"

*China's modern foreign policy changes highlighted by increase in number of decision-makers and global interests. (Page:1)
*Balancing both domestic and foreign policy interests in China is called a "two-level game." (Page:1)
-Domestic conceptions about Chinese foreign policy are beginning to be reconstructed. (Page:2)
*The UK extended <i>de jure</i> recognition to mainland China in 1950-01, against the wishes of the US. (Page:3)
*China announce clear foreign policies at the 1956 National Congress of the CCP (the first to take place): intent to lean towards the USSR, and the Five Principles. (Page:3)
-Mao still left the door open to be able to lean towards non-socialist countries as well. (Page:3)
*The Cultural Revolution in 1966 cut China off from foreign interactions. (Page:4)
*In the 1980s, improvements within China were predicated on increasing ties with the outside world. (Page:7)
-IMPORTANT: Special Economic Zones (SEZs) established in the 1980s formalized these ties. (Page:7)
*Late 1990s saw the development of China's "go out" (zouchuqu) policy. (Page:10)
*The Chinese foreign policy decision-making process is opaque to outside observers. (Page:19)
-While in the past this used to mean that foreign policy was decided by a select few at the top of the CCP, it now means that Chinese foreign policy is decided by an unknown number of actors interrelated in unknown ways. (Page:19)
*Chinese foreign policy is focused on providing China a stable domestic environment in which to grow. (Page:20)
*Deng Xiaoping chose both his successor (Jiang Zemin) and his successor's successor (Hu Jintao). (Page:20)
*Jiang Zemin deserves credit for opening China up to foreign influence, and separating foreign policy from ideology. (Page:20)
-He was also more open to contract agreements with the West and "summitry." (Page:21)
*Hu Jintao was the first to allow open expressions of foreign policy feedback from the Chinese public, which was first manifested in anti-Japan protests in 2005. (Page:23)
*China's CCP is the final decision authority on foreign policy, but the number of actors that helps form the policies has diversified greatly, to include NGOs, business, and lobby groups. (Page:24)
*China's MOFA is in charge of translating the Standing Committee's foreign policy statements into official policy for release, and runs the accounts on smaller countries. (Page:26)
*The "peaceful rise" foreign policy came not from the central government, but from Zheng Bijian, a member of the Chinese think tank called the China Reform Forum. (Page:28)
*Lanteigne agrees with Kenneth Waltz and the neorealists in believing that China's cautious foreign policy behavior is like a emulating its prey, staying on the safe side. (Page:29)
-Only the US has "system determining" power, though; China is still not a super power. (Page:29)
*China bandwagons (free-rides) when it feels it's in its best interest: 2001 war on terror, international trade, UN and international law, and transnational crime. (Page:32)
*Many of China's current leaders have technical/engineering backgrounds, which may lead them towards "techno-nationalist" policies. (Page:34)
*The Beijing Consensus was coined by Joshua Cooper; it holds three assumptions: 1. innovation brings about economic growth, 2. chaos is a constant but can be limited through measurement, and 3. national self-determination that allows states to choose the path that works for them. (Page:43-45)
*Chinese "commercial diplomacy" gets China's foot in the door through trade negotiations, and then influences foreign government decision-making from the inside; they claim that this is positive-sum. (Page:49)
*The Financial Times in 205: "if the rest of the world doesn't know where China is going, neither does china." (Page:53)
*Structural power: the ability of a nation to "influence the rules, norms, and the 'structure' of the relationship patterns within the international system." (Page:57)
*China came of age in the multi-lateral international institution environment, and knows how to get what it needs out of it. (Page:58)
*China's rejection of international institutions during Mao's early years led to its being ostracized from the international community. (Page:59)
*In the 1970s, Deng Xiaopeng began to realize that international institutions could be positive sum, and that the "shadow of the future" required cooperation in the near term to achieve long-term objectives. (Page:61)
-China participates so that it can influence the rules of the system, like its drive to join the Multi-Fibre Agrement (MFA) in 1983. (Page:61)
*IMPORTANT: As China allowed itself to be enmeshed in international legal frameworks, it started first with economic regimes rather than strategic ones because of their transparency and the ability to call out free-riders. (Page:62)
-Security regimes carry considerably more risk in the case of defection by other parties. (Page:62)
-China spent much of the 1990s trying to join the GATT/WTO, but needing to jump through hoops to satisfy U.S./WTO contractual demands. (Page:62)
*Trade rules for developed economies are much more stringent in the WTO as compared to developing economies. (Page:62)
*Over the thirty years from the 1970s to the 21st century, China has dramatically shifted from a distrust of international organizations to an embrace of them. (Page:70)
*China has learned how to benefit itself greatly through existing Western institutions, and Langeigne believes that they will continue to support existing institutions while trying to change its role within them. (Page:70)
*Three Chinese citizens died in the WTC on 9/11. (Page:84)
*China is willing to cooperate on security issues as long as they impact economic issues: Container Security Initiative (CSI) and ReCAAP. (Page:84-85)
*Hu Jintao was the first Chinese leader to frame the "Malacca Dilemma" as a problem for Chinese energy security. (Page:86)
*China is increasingly willing to allow Track II discussions like CSCAP and ASEAN-ISIS and NEAT to cover security issues, but is still unwilling to allow such meetings to touch on particularly sensitive issues like Taiwan and the SCS. (Page:86-87)
*IMPORTANT: China prefers "security communities" over carte blanche security treaties. (Page:87)
*U.S. first contact with China was to trade ginseng for black tea in 1784-1785. (Page:94)
*U.S. and China cooperated on a treaty in 1844 (Treaty of Wangxia); China wasn't used to being able to agree on a contract, because it had previously been forced to sign by European colonialists. (Page:94)
*Nixon's 1967 Foreign Affairs article opened the idea that the U.S. should bring China into the fold rather than make a new USSR-type enemy. (Page:95)
*Three phases of Chinese foreign policy:
-1. 1978-1980s: rapprochement, removing ideology from policy (Page:147)
-2. 1989-2001: Jiang Zemin switched to a communal (rather than strongman) style of government and China became a "joiner" (Page:147)
-3. 2001-Present: Hu Jintao focused on cross-regional summit diplomacy, international laws and norms (Page:148)

Source: 2014-02-04 18:18:57

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Notes from Henry Kissinger's piece "American Foreign Policy"

*Policy dilemmas arise when the predicted positive and negative outcomes of a particular proposed course of action are nearly balanced. (Page:12)
*When the domestic political structures of two countries are different or incompatible, finding foreign policy consensus can be challenging. (Page:12)
*Oftentimes foreign policy is not evaluated objectively "on its merits," but subjectively from the perspective of sovereignty. (Page:12)
*There is a "conjectural" element to foreign policy that makes decisive action difficult at the proper time. (Page:14)
*A small adjustment in the policy of a single actor within a global geopolitical system can produce outcomes of untold magnitude. (Page:15)
*The global system is too complex to be entrusted to decision-making by intuition; the decision-making system needs to be institutionalized and spread out amongst a team of actors. (Page:17)
*Bureaucracy is a decision-making tool that, if used correctly, makes the most mundane decisions at a low level and allows top decision-makers to focus on the outlier issues. (Page:18)
*Policies in complex decision-making environments become difficult to change once they are decided-upon; the pain leads policy-makers to dread making change. (Page:20)
*Foreign policy speeches are an inflection point that marks the end of internal government debate and allows government to move on to new issues (public statements cannot be taken back). (Page:23)
*Global stability is adversely affected by the difference between countries run by large bureaucracies and those run by individual mandate. (Page:26)
*The international system can be stabilized with an "agreed concept of order." (Page:57)
-The U.S. must accept multi-polarity and less control over the system in agreeing to such an institution, though. (Page:58)
*Communicating policy and intention is difficult through the use of military gestures alone; when the U.S. recalled reservists and deployed carriers after USS Pueblo was hijacked, was the U.S. demonstrating its resolve or lack of preparation? (Page:63)
-Communication of war aims similarly broke down between the U.S. and Vietnam in the Vietnam War. (Page:63)
*Political multipolarity and military mono- or bi-polarity naturally creates tensions. (Page:65)
*Consultation with foreign powers on policy issues is difficult without "an integrating over-all framework" that makes it clear what the central issues under discussion are. (Page:74)
*"...the central task of American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order." (Page:91)
*China has never had to deal with conducting a foreign policy amongst national equals; it has only ever been completely dominant or under subjugation. (Page:91)
*Though inspired individuals come to power understanding the importance of policy, they eventually get mired in playing "referee" in bureaucracies. (Page:95)
*Acting in coalitions has produced stability in US actions abroad. (Page:97)
*"To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals;" Kissinger follows this up with mention of the US-Soviet agreements in 1973 to avoid confrontation and work towards peace. (Page:153)
-This process does not always involve signing contracts or making concessions. (Page:154)
-Such relationships make crises less likely to come about in the first place and less likely to spin out of control. (Page:155)
-Political progress went hand-in-hand with economic progress with the Soviet Union. (Page:157)
*State security is at the heart of all foreign policy; a state and its people must feel safe before they can work on more complex needs. (Page:204)
*In order for effective multilateral action to be taken, consensus must be found on the importance of cooperation over conflict. (Page:242)
*The US-Japan alliance survived a tough transitionary period from "dependence" to "mutual responsibility." (Page:418)
*Talks between the US and China in the 1970s helped to not only find areas of agreement, but reduce the possibility of conflict in areas of disagreement. (Page:422)

Source: 2014-01-28 11:30:00
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Summary of Alan Cole, Phillip Drew, Rob McLaughlin, and Dennis Mandsager's piece "Rules of Engagement Handbook"

This excellent document provides very clear guidelines that military commanders can follow to create and tailor rules of engagement for specific military operations.

Source: 2014-01-22 11:12:48
File: 1390417968.pdf

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Summary of John Allen's piece "CDR ISAF Tactical Directive"

General Allen reinforces the importance of the new counter-insurgency approach to the war in Afghanistan, but highlights the need to reduce incidental civilian casualties to zero. In explaining his policy, he directs all troops to assume that all Afghanis are non-combatant civilians unless otherwise evident, and all buildings in Afghanistan are non-combatant facilities unless otherwise evident.

Source: 2014-01-22 11:12:21
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Summary of William Duiker's piece "Phan Boi Chau: Asian Revolutionary in a Changing World"

Duiker describes the rise and fall of a single Vietnamese revolutionary in the early part of the 20th century, Phan Boi Chau, and describes why his attempt at creating revolution did not succeed. He points to four reasons: 1. he was unorganized, 2. he did not properly use the proletariat, 3. he believed foreigners were necessary to his success, and 4. he didn't use ideology properly. For his labors, he died in prison, obscure and forgotten until Duiker resurrected him.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:07:02
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Notes from Anthony Reid's piece "Understanding Southeast Asian Nationalisms"

*Southeast Asian nationalism was often built on anti-imperialism; this was especially evident in Spain. (Page:25)
-The hand-off of old empires sparked the rise of nationalism. (Page:26)
*Benedict Anderson holds that the advent of the printing press in Europe unified the minds of citizens under common national identities through the creation of "unified fields of exchange" that increased "fixity." (Page:26)
-Print was late to the fight in unifying SE Asia because of the complexities of script in SE Asian languages. (Page:28)
*The advent of patrilineage came from China in 2852 BC. (Page:35)
-Surnames help hold people responsible for their familial actions, and make populations "readable." (Page:36)

Source: 2014-01-21 09:07:03
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Summary of Eric Holder's piece "Untitled Remarks to Northwestern University School of Law"

Mr. Holder defends the use of particular tactics in the conduct of post-9/11 warfare against insurgents and terrorists, claiming that all actions taken by the U.S. have been lawful and beholden to the guiding principle of the law of war.

Source: 2014-01-22 11:11:43
File: 1390417903.pdf

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Notes from Dan Crouch's piece "Legal Basis for the Use of Force"

*U.N. charter removes the right of nations to go to war.
-Exception 1. U.N. can assemble military forces to solve problems
-Exception 2. Self defense if armed attack occurs
*U.S. war in Iraq was on solid legal basis, though the legal basis expressed at the U.N. was not the same as the reasoning presented to the U.S. public
*Legitimacy is a principle of joint operations
*Speaker argues that the LOAC benefits warfighters

Source: 2014-01-22 11:11:34
File: 1390417894.mp4

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UnixM: 1391062040

Summary of Christopher Goscha's piece "Widening the Colonial Encounter: Asian Connections Inside French Indochina During the Interwar Period"

Author argues that the experience of colonization united many different ethnic groups all throughout SE Asian in the colonial period in a series of great debates on highly complex ethnic issues. Goscha argues that these ethnicity debates would be formative during the transition from colonial to independent status for many SE Asian countries, particularly Vietnam.

Source: 2014-01-21 09:05:58
File: 1390323958.pdf

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